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BINDING AUTHORITY: 
UNAMENDABILITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION—A TEXTUAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
GEORGE MADER* 
We think of constitutional provisions as having contingent 
permanence—they are effective today and, barring amendment, 
tomorrow and the day after and so on until superseded by amendment.  
Once superseded, a provision is void.1  But are there exceptions to this 
default state of contingent permanence?  Are there any provisions in the 
current United States Constitution that cannot be superseded by 
amendment—that are unamendable?  And could a future amendment 
make itself or some portion of the existing Constitution unamendable?2 
Commentators investigating limits on constitutional amendment 
frequently focus on limits imposed by natural law, the democratic 
underpinnings of our nation, or some other combination of normative 
forces exterior to the Constitution.3  Those analyses, while both interesting 
and important, require injecting into the Constitution ideas and ideals 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law.  I would like to 
express my appreciation to Professors Lyn Entrikin, Michael Flannery, and Terri Beiner for 
their commentary on various drafts of this Article.  Thanks also to Chad Schatzle, Virginia 
Neisler, and especially Melissa Serfass for excellent research assistance.  This work was 
completed with the assistance of a grant from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 
William H. Bowen School of Law. 
1.  The Eighteenth Amendment, for example, was formally repealed by the Twenty-
First Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.  
Likewise, the manner of electing the President as presented in the original Constitution was 
superseded by the Twelfth Amendment.  Compare id. amend XII, with id. art II, § 1, cl. 3. 
2.  For instance, could an amendment to the U.S. Constitution declare human life 
begins at conception, or birth, or some other stage of pregnancy, and declare the definition 
unalterable and irrepealable? 
3.  See infra Part II.A. 
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outside its text.  This Article analyzes what limits on amendment we may 
find expressed in the text of the Constitution itself. 
A careful analysis of the text of the original Constitution and the 
history of its framing offer rewarding insights in addition to new answers 
to the questions posed in the opening paragraph.4  We learn the Framers 
of the U.S. Constitution understood the difficulties—logical, syntactic, and 
political—inherent in unamendable constitutional provisions, and yet 
decided to include them.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One limit on amendment in the U.S. Constitution is widely noted: 
the provision in Article V that declares, “[N]o State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”5  But 
 
4.  “[A] deeper understanding of our Constitution may flow from some new thinking 
about the possible limits on its amendability.  Exploring the question of whether a 
constitutional amendment could itself be unconstitutional may reward us with a better 
appreciation of the Constitution itself.”  R. George Wright, Could a Constitutional 
Amendment Be Unconstitutional?, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 741, 741 (1991).  
5.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  
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that provision is far from the whole story and, by its terms, does not 
actually prohibit any type of amendment.6  
There are two provisions in the original Constitution that actually 
did prohibit amendment, and each enforced key political compromises.  
First, there is the Article V declaration that “no Amendment which may 
be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall 
in any Manner affect [two named clauses].”7  That prohibition, 
temporary though it was, had a breadth not previously appreciated.  It 
prohibited, for instance, amendment of the Three-Fifths Clause8 and 
amendment of itself.9  
The other prohibition on amendment is in Article VI: “[N]o 
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.”10  This is the only instance of the 
word “ever” in the Constitution, and it is the only time any word 
indicating permanence appears in the Constitution.  This Article 
appears to be the first significant scholarly investigation into the idea 
that the prohibition on religious tests for federal officers is a permanent, 
unamendable condition of the Constitution.  The paths leading into and 
away from that investigation are central features of this Article.   
The permanence of the prohibition on religious tests helps answer 
the question whether an amendment can be irrevocable.  As aspects of 
the original Constitution were and are unamendable, and Article V 
declares amendments are to be “valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution,”11 it follows that one can carefully write an 
amendment to be irrevocable or to make permanent an existing 
provision in the Constitution.  In this instance, too, investigating the 
question offers a renewed understanding of and appreciation for the 
history of high-stakes compromise in our Constitution. 
Deeper questions follow from these results: That one generation can 
bind another without recourse, even to constitutional amendment, 
brings up serious questions of cross-generational, even cross-epochal, 
restriction on self-government.12  Can and should the past reach into the 
 
6.  See infra Part III.B. 
7.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  
8.  Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (apportioning representatives and direct taxes among the states 
according to population, with each slave counting as three-fifths of a free person).  
9.  See infra Part III.A. 
10.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
11.  Id. art. V.  
12.  Certainly, there is always the option of extra-legal change (revolution, if you like) 
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future to enforce a permanent bargain necessary at one time to survive a 
crisis?  If there are already unamendable aspects to our Constitution, 
must there always be the option to add more such permanent aspects, or 
can we by amendment prevent them? 
Part II introduces the scholarship on unamendability in the U.S. 
Constitution and distinguishes this Article’s focus from those works.  
Part II also briefly addresses some of the logical concepts required for a 
discussion of limitations on the power of constitutional amendment, 
including the self-referential problems that arise when rules of 
amendment are applied to themselves.   
Parts III, IV, and V form the core of this Article.  Part III presents a 
detailed analysis of the meaning and effectiveness of the two explicit 
limits on amendment in Article V of the original Constitution: The first 
of which barred until 1808 any amendment affecting provisions 
regarding taxation or the importation of slaves;13 the second protected 
states’ equal vote in the Senate.14  The first of these, during the time 
before its preset expiration date, was unamendable.  The second, despite 
significant argument to the contrary, is, and always has been, 
amendable.   
Part IV introduces an additional permanent limit on amendment: 
The No Religious Test Provision in Article VI.  This provision, along 
with the two just mentioned, resulted from compromises on significant, 
even determinative, issues facing the Framers of the Constitution.   
Part V considers whether the U.S. Constitution allows amendments 
that would be in the future irrevocable.  First, it disproves the argument 
sometimes made that the First Amendment is such an amendment.  
Then Part V analyzes attempts by Congress from 1860 to 1861 to avoid 
the Civil War through irrevocable amendments, which demonstrates an 
understanding at that time that such actions were possible.  Several of 
the Crittenden proposals, seriously considered by Congress but 
ultimately not adopted, would have been unamendable.15  The Corwin 
Amendment, approved by Congress but ratified by only two states 
 
without concern for the niceties of conformance with the Constitution’s rules for amendment.  
We and future generations of Americans can do as we wish—we can “re-constitute” ourselves 
outside the dictates of the existing Constitution.  But if we hold to the Constitution and its 
unamendability, what are the ramifications of the ability of one polity to unamendably bind 
future polities?  
13.  Id. art. I, § 9, cls. 1, 4. 
14.  Id. art. V. 
15.  See infra Part V.B. 
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before events overtook and mooted its attempt to avoid war, was 
intended to forever prevent the federal government from interfering 
with slavery in the states.16  It had logical flaws that would have left it 
ineffective in accomplishing that task had it been ratified.  There have 
not (yet) been any irrevocable amendments, but they are possible. 
Part VI shows that the ability to create unamendable provisions can 
be given up, permanently, and discusses briefly whether that is 
something U.S. citizens should do.  I conclude we should neither add 
any unamendable provisions to the Constitution, but nor should we 
remove from future generations the opportunity to create such 
provisions.  
II. LIMITATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: 
A BACKGROUND 
My goal is to examine limitations on the content of constitutional 
amendments as expressed in the text of the Constitution.  In this part, I 
(1) clarify the manners in which my endeavor is related (or not) to other 
scholarship on constitutional amendment and (2) introduce the terms 
and logical concepts necessary to undertake the journey ahead. 
A. The Goal: Analysis of Express Limits on Constitutional Amendment 
To begin, I distinguish explicit, textual limitations from implicit 
limitations on amendment.  My concern is the former, not the latter.  By 
implicit limitations, I mean limits based on anything other than a specific 
portion of constitutional text limiting amendment on identifiable topics.  
Lying outside my inquiry, therefore, are arguments that norms outside 
the text of the Constitution impose limits on the content of 
constitutional amendments.17  Some have argued, for instance, that 
natural law, morality, or general legal principles place limits on what is 
 
16.  See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
17.  The argument over whether there are implicit limitations on amendment is about as 
old as the Constitution itself.  See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 54–58 (2001) (collecting debates in the 8th 
Congress surrounding the proposal of the Twelfth Amendment in which various implicit 
limits on the amending power were argued to exist); id. at 342 (noting similar debates in the 
19th Congress). 
 For modern arguments against the existence of implicit limitations on constitutional 
amendment, see JOHN R. VILE, CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 127–54 (1993), and David R. Dow, When Words 
Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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an allowable amendment.18  Others find limits imposed by general 
principles emanating from the Constitution as a whole19 or emanating 
from particular provisions.20  There are some who argue that 
unamendability itself is assumedly forbidden because it prevents future 
generations from exercising their own sovereignty.21  Such a limit, of 
 
18.  See, e.g., Charles A. Kelbley, Are There Limits to Constitutional Change? Rawls on 
Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the Basis of Equality, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2004) (investigating whether certain rights and liberties are 
“constitutional essentials” in the Rawlsian sense); Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of 
Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 754–57 (1980) (revealing a hierarchy of 
constitutional values, with the protection of human dignity at the pinnacle, and arguing that 
amendments repudiating this fundamental constitutional norm would be unconstitutional). 
19.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 291 (2005) 
(“Were some things unamendable by dint of the Constitution’s very essence?  For example, 
did the bedrock idea of republican self-government mean that strong protection for core 
political expression was an unrepealable feature of the entire constitutional project?” 
(footnote omitted)); Justin DuPratt White, Is There an Eighteenth Amendment?, 5 CORNELL 
L.Q. 113, 116 (1920) (declaring as a limit “whether or not the subject of [the proposed 
amendment] is of a class that, followed to the end by subsequent amendments, would result in 
the destruction of the United States or of the states”); Wright, supra note 4, at 764 (finding, 
“for reasons of logic,” amendments to be unconstitutional if they are incompatible with the 
assumed remainder of the Constitution). 
20.  See Selden Bacon, How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the 
Constitution, 16 VA. L. REV. 771 (1930) (arguing implicit limitations on the substance of 
constitutional amendments emanate from the combination of the Tenth Amendment and the 
Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision of Article V); Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning 
Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073–74 (1991) (finding limits on 
constitutional amendment emanating from “natural rights retained by the people” as 
acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment); George D. Skinner, Intrinsic Limitations on the 
Power of Constitutional Amendment, 18 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1920) (implicit limitations on the 
substance of constitutional amendments emanate from the confluence of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments and the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision of Article V).  But see Lester 
B. Orfield, The Scope of the Federal Amending Power, 28 MICH. L. REV. 550 (1930) (listing 
limitations proposed in the contemporary scholarship and arguing there are no limitations on 
constitutional amendment beyond those listed in Article V). 
21.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 461 (1994) (“Could a legitimate amendment 
generally purport[ing] to make itself . . . immune from further amendment . . . clearly violate 
the legal right of future generations to alter their Government?”); A. Christopher Bryant, 
Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and “Irrevocable” Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 501, 536–40 (2003) (no irrevocable amendments allowed); Douglas Linder, What 
in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 728–32 (1981) (rejecting 
several implied limitations on amendment because explicit limitations appear in the 
constitutional text but arguing unamendable amendments are invalid because, inconsistent 
with democratic theory and morality, they allow one generation to prevent succeeding 
generations from making fundamental political and moral choices).  But see John R. Vile, 
Limitations on the Constitutional Amending Process, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 373 (1985) 
(arguing there are no limits on amendment and particularly making an argument against 
Linder’s position). 
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course, assumes away the question I address: whether the text of the 
Constitution contains or allows unamendable provisions.   
B. A Brief Introduction to Constitutional Entrenchment and 
Self-Amendment 
The rules by which, and the extent to which, a constitution may be 
changed are stated in its amending provisions.22  Those provisions 
“perform the function of recognizing which rules attain constitutional 
status, which rules do not, and which rules cannot attain constitutional 
validity.”23  That amending provisions provide the rules of recognition 
for amendments makes them tremendously important,24 and when 
amending provisions are used to amend the amending provisions 
themselves, it brings to the surface the puzzles inherent in self-
referential logic.25  
 
22.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V. 
23.  Brendon Troy Ishikawa, Toward a More Perfect Union: The Role of Amending 
Formulae in the United States, Canadian, and German Constitutional Experiences, 2 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 267, 288 (1996).  
24.  See, e.g., DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at xvii (1996) (presenting a historical consideration of amending 
the United States Constitution and “locat[ing] the amending process at the very center of 
American constitutionalism [and] concluding that in practice as well as by design formal 
amendment has no equal in the American constitutional order”); Bruce A. Ackerman, The 
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1058 (1984) (“Article V is 
the most fundamental text of our Constitution, since it seeks to tell us the conditions under 
which all other constitutional texts and principles may be legitimately transformed.  Rather 
than treating it as a part of the Constitution’s code of good housekeeping, we should accord 
the text of Article V the kind of elaborate reflection we presently devote to the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”); Amar, supra note 21, at 461 (“[T]he legal rules [the 
Constitution] establishes for its own amendment are of unsurpassed importance, for these 
rules define the conditions under which all other constitutional norms may be legally 
displaced.”); Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 155, 157 (1997) (“Article V is arguably the most important structural provision 
of the Constitution.”). 
25.  By far the most complete and clear investigation of the knotty logical difficulties 
inherent in any type of self-amendment (that is, amendment of a legal text in accordance with 
procedures laid out in the text itself) is PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-
AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAW, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).  Suber’s 
excellent book provides a full treatment of the logical issues presented by the interplay 
between a constitution being at once the highest source of law and also amendable according 
to its own provisions.  I borrow much of his vocabulary to define and explain my project.  I 
caution the reader, however, not to suppose any analytical mistakes the reader may feel 
appear here are the fault of Suber—indeed, I believe he might disagree with my analysis in 
places.  In addition, Suber’s work is far deeper and broader than my use of it.  For an 
introduction to the logical concerns regarding self-amendment, see id. at xi–xvii.  For 
discussion of unamendability, see generally id. at 73–136, 163–96. 
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If an amending provision is itself subject to amendment under its 
own terms, it is a “self-embracing” amending provision.26  It is generally 
accepted that constitutional amending provisions can be used to amend 
themselves.27  An example may be helpful.  One way an amendment 
proposal becomes a valid part of the Constitution is if it receives the 
approval of at least two-thirds of each house of Congress and then is 
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures.28  Suppose an 
amendment were proposed to make those requirements more 
restrictive: 80% of each house of Congress must approve the 
amendment proposal and then 90% of the state legislatures must ratify 
the amendment.  That amendment would become part of the 
Constitution if it satisfied the amending requirements at the time it was 
proposed (two-thirds of each house approved and three-fourths of the 
state legislatures ratified).  The new, more stringent amending process 
 
26.  Id. at 73.  
27.  Many proposals for amendment of the U.S. Constitution’s Article V amending 
provisions have been made in Congress.  See, e.g., id. at 321–26 (reviewing various proposals 
for amendment of Article V); id. at 333–55 (collecting information on amendment of state 
constitutions and noting that, as of 1981, thirty-five states had amended their then-current 
amending procedures and twelve of the remaining fifteen had amended a prior amending 
procedure); see also 1 JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2010, at 16–18 (3d ed. 2010) 
(noting members of Congress have submitted about 150 proposals to amend the amending 
process, most falling into two broad categories: proposals for popular referendum and 
changes in ratification procedures).  About 11,700 amendment proposals have been 
introduced in Congress as of 2010.  Id. at xxi–xxii.  
 Article V has never been amended expressly.  See SUBER, supra note 25, at 44.  Nor does 
it appear to have been in any way implicitly amended.  Edward Hartnett in A “Uniform and 
Entire” Constitution; or, What If Madison Had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (1998), 
constructs the Constitution as it would look if the decision to display the amendments as an 
appendix rather than as interlineations had come out in favor of interlineations.  By 
Hartnett’s account, Article V is the only article of the original Constitution that remains 
unamended.  Id. at 298.  For more on the debate regarding whether the amendments should 
be listed as supplements or interlineated with the original text, see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 706–
17 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), and infra pp. 882–84. 
28.  This is, of course, only one of the manners in which the U.S. Constitution may be 
amended.  The procedural half of Article V reads: 
 The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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would become effective, despite not satisfying its provisions, for the very 
good reason that those provisions were not part of the Constitution at 
the time it was proposed and ratified.  A later amendment could return 
the requirements to two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the 
states only by meeting the requirements that 80% of each house of 
Congress approved and then 90% of the state legislatures ratified.   
At this point, we need to introduce some background terminology 
on entrenchment.  A “constitutional entrenchment provision” stipulates 
an extraordinary (more restrictive than ordinary) amending procedure 
for certain amendment(s).29  The aspects of the Constitution protected 
from ordinary amendment by the entrenchment provisions are said to 
be “entrenched” by the entrenching provision.30  
Two clarifications are in order.  First, although what is entrenched 
must be some identifiable concept expressed in the text of the 
entrenchment provision, it need not be a particular section of the 
Constitution.31  That is, while some entrenchment provisions may 
specifically reference a portion of text (for example, “Clause X is not 
amendable”) it is possible for an entrenchment provision to declare 
something more general is not amendable (like “no amendment may 
revoke the right to be secure in one’s property”).  Although I will 
continue to speak generally of “provisions” being entrenched, the 
understanding is that a quality or condition of the Constitution may be 
entrenched other than by naming specific provisions.32  Second, it 
matters not whether the entrenchment is phrased as a declaration of 
permanence or a prohibition on change: “Clause X is permanent” is the 
same as “amendments that would alter Clause X are prohibited.”33   
If the restriction imposed by an entrenchment provision prohibits all 
amendment whatsoever of the entrenched provision, the entrenchment 
is “complete.”34  But sometimes a restriction short of unamendability is 
 
29.  SUBER, supra note 25, at 75–76. 
30.  Id.  
31.  Id. at 76. 
32.  For another example, discussed in detail in infra Part III.B, the U.S. Constitution 
entrenches an equal Senate vote for each state.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  Article I, Section 3, 
Clause 1 of the Constitution stipulates each state has two Senators who each have one vote, 
but that clause is not entrenched.  Rather, the concept of equal vote in the Senate (whether 
one vote per state, or two, or seven) is entrenched.   
33.  Again, “Clause X” may also be a concept.  So “equal suffrage in the Senate is 
permanent” is equivalent to “any amendment altering equal suffrage in the Senate is 
prohibited.” 
34.  SUBER, supra note 25, at 77. 
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desired.  Such an entrenchment is “incomplete.”35  For example, if the 
ordinary process of amendment required a majority vote in a popular 
referendum but an entrenchment provision required a 60% 
supermajority vote for amendment of Clause X, the entrenchment of 
Clause X would be incomplete. 
An entrenchment provision may entrench itself.  A provision is 
“self-entrenched” (completely or incompletely depending on the nature 
of the restriction) if it declares itself subject to a more-restrictive-than-
ordinary amending process.36  If a provision entrenches only itself, it is 
“immediately self-entrenched,” but a provision is “mediately self-
entrenched” if it entrenches a class of content or provisions of which it is 
a member.37  
Four examples will elucidate the definition-dense paragraphs above 
and also serve to illustrate the final ideas in this section.   
First, an example of simple entrenchment.  Suppose a provision of 
the Constitution states, “Any amendment to Article II is valid only if 
ratified by all states.”  Such a provision would entrench Article II.  The 
entrenchment would be incomplete because the article is still 
amendable, so long as any proposed change to it is unanimously ratified 
by the states.  If the entrenching provision said instead, “Article II may 
not be amended,” then the entrenchment would be complete. 
   
Figure 1: Entrenchment of Constitutional  
Provision by Entrenchment Provision 
 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 75. 
37.  See id. at 108.  Suber uses the terms mediate and immediate to refer to the 
relationships among amending provisions, but I find it useful to expand the definition to act 
upon all provisions of a constitution.  
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Second, mediate self-entrenchment.  If we take the entrenchment 
provision above, “Article II may not be amended,” and place it inside 
Article II,38 then the entrenching provision entrenches not only the rest 
of the article but also itself.  It is a member of the set of things it 
entrenches, so it is mediately self-entrenched. 
Figure 2: Mediate Self-Entrenchment Where the 
Entrenching Provision Entrenches a Class of Content, of 
Which the Entrenching Provision Is a Part 
 
Third, an example of immediate self-entrenchment.  For example: 
“This provision, which guarantees to each state a republican form of 
government, may not be amended.”39  




38.  Because entrenchment provisions limit or alter the ordinary amending process, they 
are de facto amending provisions of the Constitution whether or not they are placed textually 
with other parts of an amending provision.  See id. at 80.   
39.  Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to each state a republican form of 
government). 
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Last, an example of an entrenching provision that is self-entrenched 
and also entrenches another provision located elsewhere in the 
Constitution.  For instance, suppose the following provision is not 
located in Article II: “Neither Article II nor this clause may be 
amended.”  Such an entrenching provision entrenches itself, 
immediately, and also entrenches Article II. 
Figure 4: Immediate Self-Entrenchment of Entrenching  
Provision, Which Is Also Entrenching Another Provision 
 
Now we reach the last and most difficult part of this journey: The 
combination of constitutional entrenchment and self-amendment.  What 
happens when an amending provision that contains entrenching 
language is amended?  Can the amending provision be used to remove 
an entrenchment of its own creation?  And if so, is the provision that 
was previously entrenched no longer protected? 
That’s a bit to take in one gulp; luckily, the examples and figures 
above go a long way to clarifying the point.  Consider the simplest 
situation, shown in Figure 1.  The example of complete entrenchment 
was an entrenching provision stating: “Article II may not be amended.”  
But suppose the entrenching provision itself is not entrenched (either by 
self-entrenchment or entrenchment by another entrenchment 
provision).  That means the entrenching provision itself is subject to 
amendment (including its removal).  As a result, despite Article II’s 
supposed complete entrenchment, Article II may be amended in two 
steps, each of which requires only ordinary amendment.  The first step is 
an amendment that removes the entrenching provision (which, as it is 
not entrenched, is subject to ordinary amendment).  That amendment 
did not violate the entrenching provision because it did not amend 
Article II.  The second step is an amendment that alters Article II 
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(which is no longer entrenched).40  This “two-step process” will defeat 
any entrenchment provision that is not itself entrenched.41  
Compare the above situation to that in Figure 4.  In that example, 
the entrenching provision stated: “Neither Article II nor this clause may 
be amended.”  Any amendment to the entrenching provision would 
violate the requirement that it not be amended.  The provision’s self-
entrenchment prevents step one of the two-step process just mentioned, 
thus protecting all of the entrenched Article II.  So for an entrenchment 
provision to be effective, it must itself be entrenched (or entrench itself) 
at least as deeply as it entrenches the provision(s) it protects.42  
So for a constitutional provision to be unamendable, it must be 
either (1) completely self-entrenched or (2) ultimately entrenched by a 
provision that is itself completely self-entrenched.  Below I show the 
original U.S. Constitution had two completely self-entrenched 
provisions, and still has one. 
III. ENTRENCHMENT IN ARTICLE V OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION 
The explicitly stated means of amending the Constitution are located 
in Article V43: 
 
40.  See SUBER, supra note 25, at 75–76. 
41.  A series of entrenchment provisions will work as well, provided it terminates in a 
self-entrenched provision.  For instance, “Entrenching Provision 1” is unamendable (even if it 
is not itself self-entrenched) if it is completely entrenched by a separate “Entrenching 
Provision 2,” which is completely entrenched.  Likewise for any finite chain of completely 
entrenching provisions ultimately ending in a completely self-entrenched provision.  
42.  See id. at 75–77.  What I mean by “as deeply entrenched” is merely (1) if the 
entrenched provision is completely entrenched by the entrenchment provision, then the 
entrenchment provision must also be completely entrenched; and (2) if the entrenched 
provision is incompletely entrenched (amendment allowed, albeit requiring some 
extraordinary measure), then the entrenchment provision must be at least as difficult to 
amend. 
43.  That Article V is not the sole means of constitutional amendment has been explored 
by, among others, Bruce Ackerman (espousing a view that constitutional transformation 
occurs in two ways, through both Article V amendment and through a process of 
transformative statutory law and judicial review) and Akhil Reed Amar (arguing that in 
addition to the process available under Article V, the Constitution can constitutionally be 
amended by popular vote because the Constitution includes an understanding that the people 
retained their right to popular sovereignty).  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS (1991); Ackerman, supra note 24, at 1058; Amar, supra note 21, at 457; Akhil 
Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1043 (1988).  Among those who argue for exclusivity of the Article V amending 
process and against the views expressed by Ackerman and Amar, see Dow, supra note 17; 
Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional 
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996); John R. Vile, Legally Amending the United 
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The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several 
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, 
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may 
be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred 
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in 
the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.44 
The two provisions in italics are express limits on the amending 
power—in the language of the previous section of this Article, they are 
entrenchment provisions.  The first provision, restricting until 1808 any 
amendment “affect[ing]” Article I, Section 9, Clauses 1 and 4, I will 
refer to as the “Sunset Entrenchment Provision” due to its explicit 
expiration date.  I will refer to the second italicized provision, for 
obvious reasons, as the “Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision.”   
The drafting history of Article V is informative for the argument 
that follows.  On May 29, 1787, the third day of the Constitutional 
Convention, Edmund Randolph introduced a series of resolutions that 
became the initial framework for the summer-long process of creating 
the Constitution.45  The thirteenth of Randolph’s fifteen resolutions 
provided “for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it 
shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature 
ought not to be required thereto.”46  That resolution was barely touched 
in the first two months of the Convention; on July 26, as referred to the 
Committee of Detail, the provision had merely been shortened to read, 
“That Provision ought to be made for the Amendment of the Articles of 
 
States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V’s Mechanisms, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 271 (1990–
1991).  
 For purposes of my argument, I am setting aside the question of whether Article V offers 
the exclusive means of amending the Constitution.  Doing so allows me to more clearly 
explain my argument and more narrowly focus on the issue of limits on amendment as 
declared in the text of the Constitution itself.   
44.  U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
45.  1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20–23 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911).  
46.  Id. at 22. 
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Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.”47  The Convention then 
adjourned for eleven days to allow the Committee of Detail to “prepare 
& report the Constitution.”48  When the Committee of Detail reported 
its draft on August 6, the amending provision was still a simple 
statement: “On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the 
Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that 
purpose.”49  
Over the next twenty-four days, the Convention took up, more or 
less in numerical order, each of the twenty-three articles in the 
Committee of Detail’s draft.50  As the amending provision was Article 
XIX51 of the draft, it was not reached until August 30, at which point the 
only recorded discussion among the delegates was whether to allow 
Congress to call an amending convention without state application, 
which was agreed to without dissent.52  There were no entrenchment 
clauses, and for the next eleven days the Convention debated and 
rewrote other portions of the draft constitution.53  It was not until 
September 10 that constitutional amendment and entrenchment came to 
the fore.54   
A. Sunset Entrenchment Provision 
The Sunset Entrenchment Provision has received scant attention 
from those analyzing the limits of constitutional amendment; most 
often, it is quickly noted that the provision prevented until 1808 
amendment of the clauses it entrenched, with little or no additional 
analysis.55  But to understand entrenchment within the original 
 
47.  2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 133 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter 2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
48.  Id. at 128. 
49.  Id. at 188.  
50.  Id. at 193–482.  
51.  A misnumbering in the printed copy of the report of the Committee of Detail 
resulted in there being two Articles numbered “VI.”  Id. at 181 n.5.  Thus, the printed number 
for the amending provision was XVIII, but in the deliberations it was referred to as Article 
XIX. 
52.  Id. at 467–68.  
53.  Id. at 470–554. 
54.  Id. at 557. 
55.  This inattention may be because the Sunset Entrenchment Provision is doubly 
mooted—first by its 1808 expiration date and second in that its specific reference is to two 
provisions no longer in effect: one addressing the importation of slaves and the other a 
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Constitution, we must consider every instance of it.  Fortunately, the 
Constitution often rewards careful study of its nooks and crannies, and 
this case is no different.  An analysis of the provision reveals much 
about the Framers’ understanding of both this provision in particular 
and constitutional entrenchment in general. 
On September 10, 1787, exactly one week before the delegates 
signed the final version of the Constitution, the Convention again took 
up the amending provision in an attempt to cure the dissatisfactions 
expressed by various members.56  James Madison then proposed a 
rewriting of the article, the substance of which would become much of 
the first, procedural half of Article V.57  Still, there were no 
entrenchment provisions.  
Before Madison’s motion could be voted on, John Rutledge, 
delegate of South Carolina, moved to include the Sunset Entrenchment 
Provision.58  Rutledge stated he “never could agree to give a power by 
which the articles relating to slaves might be altered by the States not 
interested in that property and prejudiced against it.”59  He successfully 
moved that the following be appended to Madison’s proposed language: 
“provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year 
1808, shall in any manner affect the 4 & 5 sections of the VII article,” 
 
taxation provision amended (by the Sixteenth Amendment) over 100 years ago.  See U.S. 
CONST. amends. XIII, XVI. 
56.  Some delegates were dissatisfied with the vagueness of the amending provision’s 
wording, others feared the possibility a majority of states at a future amending convention 
might be able to alter the Constitution, and some desired a means by which the federal 
legislature might propose amendments to the states for ratification.  2 THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 557–59; see also Linder, supra note 21, at 720 (summarizing 
concerns of the delegates). 
57.  Madison’s proposal read: 
The Legislature of the U[nited] S[tates] whenever two thirds of both Houses shall 
deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several 
States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all 
intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by 
three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in 
three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by 
the Legislature of the U.S. 
2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 559.  The amending provision this proposal 
replaced would have allowed two-thirds of the states to require Congress to call a convention 
for the proposing of amendments.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  That 
requirement was re-added on September 15.  See 2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 
47, at 629–30. 
58.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 559. 
59.  Id. 
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the numbered clauses of the then-existing constitutional draft that were 
later to become Article I, Section 9, Clauses 1 and 4.60 
The resulting Sunset Entrenchment Provision, as approved by the 
Convention on September 15, read: “Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and 
eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth 
Section of the first Article . . . .”61  And the constitutional provisions 
entrenched until 1808 were: 
 [Article I, Section 9, Clause 1:] The Migration or Importation 
of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to 
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or 
duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each Person. 
. . . . 
 [Article I, Section 9, Clause 4:] No Capitation, or other direct, 
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.62 
The presence of 1808 as an expiration date in both the Sunset 
Entrenchment Provision and one of the provisions it entrenched63 is 
significant—the temporal link demonstrates the delegates understood 
and attempted to avoid an analog of the two-step process previously 
described64 by which an entrenched provision could be amended.  
Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 prohibited certain legislation until 1808.65  
But Rutledge feared the provision could be amended out of the 
 
60.  This motion was agreed to by a vote of nine states in favor, one against, and one 
state’s delegation divided on the question.  Id.  
61.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
62.  Id. art. I, § 9, cls. 1, 4. 
63.  As of 1808, Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 was to expire conterminally with the 
provision entrenching it; thereafter Congress would be free to legislate on the slave trade.  
Congress did just that—by an act effective on January 1, 1808.  Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 
Stat. 426.  
 The other provision referenced in the entrenching provision, Clause 4 of Article I, 
Section 9, the provision as to proportionate taxation, was to be protected from amendment 
until 1808.  At that point, it was no longer entrenched and reverted to an ordinary 
constitutional provision amendable by ordinary means—as it eventually was by the Sixteenth 
Amendment in 1913.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
64.  See supra pp. 852–53. 
65.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1.   
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Constitution early on, allowing Congress to ban the slave trade by 
statute before 1808.66  One goal of the Sunset Entrenchment Provision 
was to prevent, until that same year, any constitutional amendment 
removing the prohibition on legislation.  Thus the delegates understood 
the amendment + legislation analog of the amendment + amendment 
two-step process.67    
Having that understanding, the delegates would have known the 
Sunset Entrenchment Provision itself needed, as we have noted earlier, 
to be at least as deeply entrenched as the provision it entrenched.  They 
must have intended to entrench the Sunset Entrenchment Provision 
until 1808 as well.68  
But intent alone is not enough;69 we need to investigate whether the 
words of the Sunset Entrenchment Provision created a truly effective 
entrenchment.  
As we are testing whether the first step of the two-step process can 
be taken, we ask whether removal of the Sunset Entrenchment 
Provision prior to 1808 would have violated the entrenchment provision 
itself.  By its terms, the Sunset Entrenchment Provision prohibits 
amendments that “shall in any Manner affect” the entrenched 
provisions.70  Therefore, the test for determining which amendments are 
prohibited is whether the amendment “shall affect” the entrenched 
provisions “in any manner.”71  Removing the Sunset Entrenchment 
Provision would have changed the amendatory status of the previously 
entrenched provisions; they would have become unprotected from 
ordinary amendment.  Such a disentrenchment, though it would not 
have removed the provisions themselves, would have “affect[ed]” them 
“in any manner.”72  Thus, the Sunset Entrenchment Provision is itself a 
 
66.  See 2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 559. 
67.  See supra pp. 852–53. 
68.  See supra note 63.   
69.  Because an entrenchment provision is ineffective when it is not entrenched at least 
as deeply as the provision(s) it protects, some will assume self-entrenchment where an 
entrenching provision appears not to be self-entrenched, thus keeping the entrenchment 
provision from being ineffective.  Such assumed entrenchment is the rough equivalent to 
wishful thinking and is invalid.  See SUBER, supra note 25, at 75, 81 (noting “there is a 
temptation to read every entrenchment clause as impliedly self-entrenched” to avoid the two-
step difficulty).   
70.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
71.  See id. 
72.  Thus, the first step in any attempted two-step amendment process fails.  But see 
AMAR, supra note 19, at 292–93 (offering the possibility that a two-step amendment 
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member of the class of provisions it entrenches—it mediately entrenches 
itself.73   
Figure 5: Sunset Entrenchment Provision Entrenching a Set of 
Constitutional Provisions, of Which It Is Itself a Member 
 
This argument—that the words “in any Manner affect” mediately 
self-entrenches the Sunset Entrenchment Provision—places a heavy 
interpretive weight on those words.  But the words can bear the weight. 
Let us assume for a moment that John Rutledge, when he proposed 
the Sunset Entrenchment Provision, intended to entrench only the two 
clauses it named.  If that were the case, why not something simpler: 
“Sections X and Y may not be amended before 1808”?  Why use the 
phrase “shall in any Manner affect,” unless it was intended to entrench a 
broader set of provisions?74  Nor does it appear the wording was 
offhanded—Rutledge had eleven days from the previous August 30 
discussion of the amending provision to consider and frame his 
amendment.75  
 
process—first removing the Sunset Entrenchment Provision, then amending the previously 
entrenched provisions—would be effective). 
73.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing mediate self-entrenchment). 
74.  For instance, Arthur W. Machen, Jr., in Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 
HARV. L. REV. 169, 172 (1910), observes, “[T]he prohibition of an amendment prior to 1808 
interfering with the slave trade . . . necessarily implied that no constitutional amendment 
should be adopted prior to 1808 abolishing slavery in the original states.” 
75.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 468, 559.  Compare those eleven 
days to infra pp. 864–66, 869, discussing the more spontaneous creation of the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision.   
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If Rutledge intended the Sunset Entrenchment Provision to reach 
beyond the named clauses, to what would it reach?  Consider the 
interpretation offered of the Sunset Entrenchment Provision by James 
Iredell, later Supreme Court Justice,76 at the 1788 North Carolina 
ratifying convention:  
 It is, however, to be observed, that the 1st and 4th clauses in 
the 9th section of the 1st article are protected from any alteration 
till the year 1808 . . . .  [These] prohibitions are with respect to the 
census, (according to which direct taxes are imposed,) and with 
respect to the importation of slaves.  As to the first, [which states 
any “direct tax” must be “in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken,”] it must be 
observed, that there is a material difference between the 
Northern and Southern States.  The Northern States have been 
much longer settled, and are much fuller of people, than the 
Southern, but have not land in equal proportion, nor scarcely any 
slaves.  The subject of this article was regulated with great 
difficulty, and by a spirit of concession which it would not be 
prudent to disturb for a good many years.  In twenty years, there 
will probably be a great alteration, and then the subject may be 
reconsidered with less difficulty and greater coolness.77   
The census provision to which Iredell referred states: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among 
the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers, 
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of 
free Persons . . . excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all 
other Persons.  The actual Enumeration shall be made within 
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress . . . .78 
Iredell’s discussion of the census, populations, and slaves indicates 
he considered the census provision, including its Three-Fifths Clause, to 
be entrenched (at least as to taxation) until 1808.  That means Iredell 
believed the Three-Fifths Clause to “in any Manner affect”79 Clauses 1 
and 4 of Article I, Section 9.  If this is a correct interpretation of Iredell’s 
 
76.  Iredell is perhaps best known as the lone dissenter in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419 (1793), the overturning of which was the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. 
77.  Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), as reprinted in 4 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 582, 583 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) 
(statement of James Iredell) (emphasis added). 
78.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
79.  Id. art. V.  
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statement, it demonstrates the Sunset Entrenchment Provision 
entrenches provisions beyond the clauses it names specifically.   
But however reasonable one finds my interpretation of Iredell’s 
statement, it is a slender cord upon which to hang a weighty argument.  
We need more evidence that the Three-Fifths Clause was understood to 
be entrenched until 1808 on the ground that amending it would “in any 
Manner affect” Article I, Section 9, Clause 4’s requirement that no 
direct tax should be levied “unless in Proportion to the Census or 
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”80 
We can expect such evidence to be scarce because, if it was 
understood the Three-Fifths Clause was unamendable until 1808, 
nothing would happen.  Even those who wanted to change the clause 
would wait for 1808.  But such inaction does not prove anything—
people could have sat on their hands with respect to the Three-Fifths 
Clause for any of several reasons beyond an understanding that it was 
unamendable.  What would provide support for the argument is a 
discussion before 1808 exhibiting a desire to amend the Three-Fifths 
Clause but expressing an understanding that such an amendment must 
wait until 1808.  And that is what we have—at least twice. 
First, and of lesser importance, in October of 1803, in the process of 
debating what was to become the Twelfth Amendment, Representative 
Seth Hastings of Massachusetts stated: “I hope, sir, that in the year 1808, 
an alteration will be made in this part of the Constitution, [the Three-
Fifths Clause] and that the representation, by being proportioned only 
to the number of free persons, will be rendered equal and just.”81  This 
indicates that, in Mr. Hastings’ view, the Three-Fifths Clause was 
unalterable until 1808, not only as to taxation but also as to 
representation.  Hastings’s comment gains a little additional value 
because he was speaking against his interest; he would have preferred 
not to wait, but he understood the Constitution to require it.   
A far more convincing piece of evidence comes from the Senate 
floor a year later.  In December 1804, Senator Timothy Pickering of 
Massachusetts proposed an amendment to the Constitution “in such 
manner that representatives and direct taxes may be apportioned among 
the several States according to the number of their free inhabitants, 
respectively.”82  The amendment, however, specified that it was not to 
 
80.  Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.  
81.  12 ANNALS OF CONG. 536 (1803).  
82.  14 ANNALS OF CONG. 21 (1804). 
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take effect until after 1808: 
From and after the third day of March, one thousand eight 
hundred and nine, representatives and direct taxes, shall be 
apportioned among the several states, which may be included 
within this Union, according to the numbers of their free 
inhabitants, respectively.83 
This is the only constitutional amendment proposal prior to 1808 to 
suggest altering the formula by which representation, let alone direct 
taxation, was to be apportioned.84  The March 3, 1809, date in 
Pickering’s proposal would have required the Congress elected in 1808 
(which would take office March 4, 1809),85 be apportioned in accordance 
with the population of free inhabitants, rather than under the formula 
created by the Three-Fifths Clause.86  In a letter to the Massachusetts 
governor that Pickering and his fellow Senator from Massachusetts, 
John Quincy Adams, wrote shortly after introducing the proposal, they 
clarified their understanding that (1) the amendment could not 
constitutionally take effect before 1808 and (2) attempting to change the 
apportionment of representation in the middle of a congressional term 
 
83.  Motion offering a resolution that representatives and direct taxes be apportioned 
among the several states according to their free inhabitants, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 7, 1804) 
(digital copy on file with author). 
84.  HERMAN V. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES DURING THE FIRST CENTURY OF ITS HISTORY (1896), reprinted in 2 AM. 
HISTORICAL ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT 244 (1897) (“The first [amendment touching on direct 
taxes] was presented in 1804 by Senator Pickering of Massachusetts . . . .”). 
 Although the proposal appears to have been drafted by Pickering and his fellow 
Massachusetts Senator John Quincy Adams, see infra note 87, the subject matter of the 
amendment came to them from the Massachusetts state legislature and was known as the 
“Ely Amendment” after a chief proponent of the measure in that body.  AMES, supra, at 45 & 
n.5; see also 3 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 44–45 (1891).  As was customary at 
that time, the Massachusetts resolutions had been sent to the other states; the reaction was 
overwhelmingly negative.  MCMASTER, supra, at 45–46; see also LINDA K. KERBER, 
FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 36–39, 
64–65 (1970); LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND 
SOUTHERN DOMINATION 1780–1860, at 43–44 (2000). 
85.  Except for the second Congress, which concluded business on March 2, 1793 (March 
3 being a Sunday), the biennial Congresses through the date of Pickering’s amendment 
proposal had ended their terms on March 3 of each odd-numbered year.  Dates of Sessions of 
the Congress, 1789–Present, SENATE.GOV, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm [https://perma.cc/TR9R-JQAM] 
(last visited May 24, 2016).  
86.  RICHARDS, supra note 84, at 43. 
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was impractical.87  Thus, under the proposed amendment, 
representation in the House would be recalculated in 1808 based on free 
population, elections in 1808 would reflect that apportionment, and the 
newly apportioned Congress would take office March 4, 1809.88   
Thus, the words “in any Manner affect”89 were understood early on 
to include within their ambit the Three-Fifths Clause, a provision 
 
87.   
 Until we attempted to frame an amendment, which, conformably to the 
resolution of the two houses of our [Massachusetts] Legislature, should exclude 
slaves from representation in the government of the United States, we were not fully 
aware of the distant period to which an effectual adoption of the amendment might, 
in compliance with existing provisions of the Constitution, be postponed. 
 By the 4th clause of the 9th section of the 1st article, it is declared, that “no 
capitation, or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or 
enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”  That census, for the purposes of 
representation & taxation, constitutes five slaves as equivalent to three freemen.  
The 5th article provides that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 
1808, shall in any manner affect the first & fourth clauses in the 9th section of the 
first article: consequently, no direct tax can be laid, prior to the year 1808, but 
according to the census which embraces slaves: and pursuant to the third clause of 
the second section of the first article, Representation must correspond with the rule 
of taxation. 
 The representation for slaves, must then be admitted until the year 1808.  But 
prior to that year, the tenth Congress comprehending representatives for slaves will 
necessarily be in session; and not finish its term until the third day of March 1809: 
Hence the impossibility of rendering the proposed amendment operative prior to 
that day.  For if the principle were not opposed in Congress or in the state 
legislatures, the measure to be founded on the principle which should involve the 
necessity of reducing the number of representatives from the states having slaves, 
after they were elected & actually convened in Congress would certainly be 
rejected.  
Letter from Timothy Pickering and John Quincy Adams to Governor of Massachusetts Caleb 
Strong (Jan. 28, 1805), in 14 PAPERS OF TIMOTHY PICKERING Doc. 117 (Massachusetts 
Historical Society ed.) (underlines as in original). 
88.  Id.  
89.  Similar wording in another part of the Constitution bolsters a broad reading of the 
word “affect.”  The related word “affecting” occurs twice in the original Constitution.  Both 
instances are in Article III, Section 2’s description of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
through which “Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” are placed 
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2.  
 A case may “affect” diplomatic personnel without engaging them as parties, much as an 
amendment may “in any Manner affect” Article I, Section 9, Clauses 1 and 4 without directly 
amending them.  The Judiciary Act of 1789, codifying the “affecting” jurisdiction, included 
“all . . . suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics, 
or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law of 
nations.”  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80–81 (emphasis added).  As an 
illustration, consider the situation in which the baker of the chargé d’affaires of the King of 
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textually separate from the provisions specifically identified in the 
entrenching provision.  The Sunset Entrenchment Provision entrenched 
a class of constitutional provisions radiating out from the Article I 
provisions it specifically named, and the entrenchment provision itself 
fits comfortably into that class of entrenched provisions. 
The Framers understood the ability of a two-step process of 
amendments to disentrench constitutional provisions and, in creating 
the Sunset Entrenchment Provision, they intended to avoid that 
difficulty.90  Rutledge chose, and the Convention approved, broad 
language to achieve the purpose of entrenching “articles relat[ing] to 
slaves.”91  The prohibition on all amendments “in any Manner 
affect[ing]”92 the named clauses in Article I, Section 9 includes 
amendments altering the Sunset Entrenchment Provision itself; thus, the 
provision entrenched itself and was unamendable until it expired under 
its own terms in 1808. 
B. Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision 
The very last changes made to the Constitution before the complete 
document was agreed to on September 15, 1787, and engrossed were 
alterations made to Article V.93  First, the delegates voted to add to 
 
Sweden was able under the Judiciary Act to quash his criminal indictment issued by a circuit 
court on grounds his case must be heard originally in the U.S. Supreme Court because the 
criminal indictment of his baker “affected” the Swedish chargé d’affaires.  United States v. 
LaFontaine, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D.C. 1831) (No. 15,500).   
 Even this understanding of “affect” may be too narrow.  John C. Massaro makes an 
originalist argument that the 1789 Judiciary Act and its successors, in codifying “affecting” 
jurisdiction, have not extended the jurisdiction to its full constitutional reach.  John C. 
Massaro, The Forgotten Jurisdiction, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 83, 87–94, 141–43 (2012).   
 I note, merely for completeness, that “affect” also appears in the third clause of the 
Seventeenth Amendment: “This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  My inquiry here is the meaning the Framers gave “affect” in 
Article V, so I am not concerned with the meaning of that term in the Seventeenth 
Amendment.  That said, I have found no case law or other relevant construction of the word 
“affect” as used in the Seventeenth Amendment. 
90.  See SUBER, supra note 25, at 75–76, 80–81. 
91.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 559.  
92.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
93.  See 2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 629–31.  There was one more 
change to the Constitution, on September 17, by erasure and rewriting after the engrossed 
Constitution had been read to the members of the Convention, and just before the delegates 
signed the document.  Id. at 643–44.  This was the famous instance in which the President of 
the Convention, George Washington, who had not participated in any debate to that point, 
supported a proposal by Massachusetts delegate Nathaniel Gorham to provide one 
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Article V the convention method of proposing amendments.94  At that 
moment, Article V read exactly as it does today, except for the absence 
of the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision.95  Connecticut delegate 
Roger Sherman expressed concern that, under the amending provision, 
“three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal to 
particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of 
their equality in the Senate.”96  Therefore, “[h]e thought it reasonable 
that the proviso in favor of the States importing slaves [, the Sunset 
Entrenchment Provision,] should be extended so as to provide that no 
State should be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equality 
in the Senate.”97  
Sherman’s solution to this problem took the form of a series of 
proposed amendments to Article V, each with a view to protecting the 
small states, and each defeated.98  As presaged by his previous comment, 
Sherman moved99 to annex to the Sunset Entrenchment Provision a 
declaration “that no State shall without its consent be affected in its 
internal police, or deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate”; this motion 
was defeated.100  Next, Sherman moved to strike Article V altogether, 
 
representative in the House of Representatives for each 30,000 inhabitants, rather than for 
every 40,000; this proposal was agreed to unanimously.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 629–30; see also supra note 57.  This provision had previously been removed. 
95.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 629–30. 
96.  Id. at 629. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 630–31. 
99.  Shortly before the motion described in the text, Sherman had moved the removal of 
the three-fourths requirement for ratification by state legislatures or conventions, thus 
“leaving future conventions to act in this matter, like the present Convention according to 
circumstances.”  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 630.  Future drafting 
conventions would be able to specify the numbers necessary to ratify, as the Convention did 
in Article VII.  See Carlos E. González, Representational Structures Through Which We the 
People Ratify Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of the Constitution’s 
Ratification Clauses, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1473 (2005) (so interpreting Sherman’s 
motion).   
 For such an amendment to protect states from federal power (as wielded by collections 
of states), as Sherman apparently intended, his idea must have been that the ratification 
scheme for any such future convention would allow any states displeased by the Convention’s 
results to opt out of the Union at that point by refusing to ratify the amended Constitution.  
Cf. John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential 
Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992, 1005–06 (1992) (addressing whether 
amendments proposed by a constitutional convention would require ratification in 
accordance with Article V or whether the convention could make its own rule for adoption of 
the amendments, as did the Constitutional Convention of 1787).  
100.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 630.   
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leaving the Constitution with no explicit amending provision.101  This, 
too, was defeated.102   
With the delegations from some of the small states clearly 
disgruntled by the run of defeated proposals, Gouverneur Morris 
(delegate from Pennsylvania, a large state) then proposed adopting a 
portion of Sherman’s earlier proposal—dropping the prohibition on 
amendments “affect[ing a state] in its internal police” and keeping the 
rest; this passed.103  The resulting Equal Suffrage Entrenchment 
Provision declares amendments, proposed and ratified in accordance 
with the procedure set out in the first half of Article V, “shall be 
valid . . . Provided . . . that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”104   
The Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision entrenches only 
incompletely the equal suffrage of the Senate,105 as there is no outright 
ban on unequal Senate suffrage but rather a requirement that any state 
“deprived” of equal suffrage must “consent” to the deprivation for it to 
be valid.106  
But is even that incomplete entrenchment truly effective?  Recall 
that to prevent the two-step amendment process, the entrenching 
provision must be as deeply entrenched as the provision it is 
entrenching.  The important question for our purposes, then, is how 
deeply entrenched is the consent requirement itself?  Is it entrenched at 
least so deeply as the provision it protects (consent of each state)? 
 
101.  Id.  
102.  Id. at 630–31.  The votes were not close.  Only Connecticut and New Jersey 
supported all of Sherman’s motions, and no motion was supported by more than three states.  
Id. 
103.  Id.  Madison reported this addition to Article V was “dictated by the circulating 
murmurs of the small States [and] was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the 
question, saying no.”  Id. 
104.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
105.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text (defining incomplete entrenchment). 
106.  The precise manner in which the requirements of the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision would be satisfied depends on the meanings of the words “consent” 
and “deprived.”  How would a state consent to a reduction in its Senate vote?  Because 
nonequal suffrage would require constitutional amendment, perhaps the “consent” of a state 
may be expressed by its ratification of the amendment depriving it of equal suffrage in the 
Senate.  One might also argue that under the terms of the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment 
Provision, any change in Senate suffrage would require consent of all states, the argument 
being no state at that point has an equal vote.  See, e.g., Vile, supra note 21, at 379 
(“[U]nanimous state consent [is] required for altering a state’s equal suffrage in the Senate.”). 
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Some commentators have assumed the consent requirement in the 
Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision is perpetual—completely 
unamendable.107  Based on the text, this is simply incorrect.  The consent 
requirement for the loss of a state’s equal Senate vote does not 
specifically entrench itself.  Nor does it, as the Sunset Entrenchment 
Provision did,108 entrench a class of provisions of which it is a member.  
Thus, by the two-step process, two ordinary amendments could alter 
suffrage in the Senate.   
Here is the refutation in detail.  The Equal Suffrage Entrenchment 
Provision bars any amendment that deprives a state of its equal Senate 
suffrage without consent.109  An amendment removing the entire Equal 
Suffrage Entrenchment provision, and thereby removing the consent 
requirement, would not violate the entrenchment provision because 
such an amendment would deprive no state of its equal vote in the 
Senate (let alone without its consent).  Thus, the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision could be removed by ordinary amendment 
without violating its own requirement.  Once that provision were 
removed, Article V’s rules for amending the Constitution would no 
longer require consent from a state for its vote in the Senate to be 
altered.  Such an alteration could be proposed and ratified, again by 
ordinary amendment.  
Several commentators have discussed the two-step amendment 
process for eliminating the requirement of equal suffrage in the 
Senate,110 but most balk at allowing it—regarding it to be a 
circumvention of an obvious intent by the Framers.111  This argument is 
 
107.  See, e.g., William L. Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States, 33 
HARV. L. REV. 659, 661 (1920) (describing the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision as 
requiring “no state should ever, without its consent, be deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
Senate” (emphasis added)); Machen, supra note 74, at 172 (“The provision . . . that no state 
without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate [is] perpetual . . . .”). 
 Most such arguments note the dicta in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 348 (1855) (stating 
that the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision is a “permanent and unalterable exception[] 
to the power of amendment”); see also Vile, supra note 43, at 295. 
108.  See supra Part III.A. 
109.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
110.  For recognition of the possibility that the two-step process might be successful, see, 
e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 111–12 (3d ed. 2000); 
Amar, supra note 21, at 461; Walter F. Murphy, Merlin’s Memory: The Past and Future 
Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 163, 176 n.41 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
111.  AMAR, supra note 19, at 293 (characterizing the two-step process as a “sly 
scheme”); GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A COMMENTARY 192 (1989) 
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simply a retreat to assumed entrenchment, the assumption being that 
the consent requirement of the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision 
may be removed only under the same conditions that a state might lose 
equal suffrage in the Senate—the state’s consent.112  As every state 
would be losing the protection, then, removal of the consent 
requirement would require unanimous ratification.113  As noted earlier, I 
am unwilling to countenance such assumed entrenchment.114  It may well 
have been the intent of the delegates that the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision be itself entrenched.  But that is not enough.   
The best textual argument for unanimous ratification being required 
to remove the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision goes like this: 
Removing the provision would be to remove the protection of consent it 
offers to states; therefore, removal of the consent requirement itself 
requires consent of each state—and thus, removing the entrenchment 
provision would require unanimous ratification of the change by the 
states.  
But that argument requires a somewhat tortured reading of the text.  
The provision says, “[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”115  The provision clearly requires 
consent for deprivation of an equal vote, but not for loss of the 
entrenchment provision itself.  That reading gives full meaning to, and 
use of, the word “consent.”  Adding a consent requirement to alter the 
 
(calling the two-step process “devious”); Wright, supra note 4, at 757 (agreeing there is a 
strong case that the two-step process is procedurally valid but has “no detectable purpose 
other than to circumvent the requirement that no state be deprived of equal representation in 
the Senate” because its “transparent evasion of the express restriction on amendments in 
article V” violates an implicit limitation on constitutional amendment). 
112.  See, e.g., SUBER, supra note 25, at 101 (“In general one might find in any 
[amending provision] an implied limitation self-entrenching any incomplete entrenchment 
clause at the same level of difficulty it requires for the amendment of the rule it protects.  
Such an implied limitation is certainly a reasonable reading of the intent of the 
framers . . . because an incomplete entrenchment clause that is not self-entrenched is virtually 
pointless.”).   
113.  Akhil Reed Amar apparently assumes such entrenchment.  See AMAR, supra note 
19, at 293.  He notes the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision does not “contradict the 
idea of general amendability.  Even had these words [of the provision] been airtight, they did 
not purport to make anything formally unamendable.  Rather, they merely provided for an 
alternative amendment procedure that in effect required unanimity among the states.”  Id.; 
see also Orfield, supra note 20, at 577 (“The only legal way to drop the [equal suffrage] 
proviso would be by a unanimous ratification . . . .”). 
114.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
115.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  
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provision itself requires the word “consent” to perform double duty 
where such a reading is unwarranted.   
If double consent were the goal, why not use the word twice?  The 
provision might have read: “No state, without its consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, and all states must consent 
to any alteration in this provision.”  That would have been clear.  If that 
appears too clunky, why not simply “no state shall ever be deprived of 
its equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent.”116  That sentence 
can bear the weight of entrenching both the consent requirement and 
itself.  Without the word “ever” the provision would require consent for 
a change in equal suffrage.  With the word “ever” the consent 
requirement itself becomes entrenched. 
So we are left with the question: If the Framers understood the two-
step process of disentrenchment, as I have argued they did,117 and they 
also intended the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision to 
permanently provide a consent requirement for alteration of the 
equality of Senate suffrage, why did they fail to write an effective 
entrenchment provision?  Perhaps it was haste.  Recall that the Equal 
Suffrage Entrenchment Provision was added on the final business day of 
the Convention.118  Also, whereas the Sunset Entrenchment Provision 
was the entirety of John Rutledge’s proposal,119 the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision was the borrowed second half of Roger 
Sherman’s original proposal—proposed in a moment of discord by 
Gouverneur Morris.120 
It is worth noting, too, that even if the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment 
Provision is not itself entrenched, and thus may be removed from the 
Constitution, that removal itself would serve as a warning of the 
possibility of change and simultaneously expose every state to potential 
loss.  Equal suffrage in the Senate is not protected to the degree it is 
 
116.  Note that this is precisely what is done by the commentators who argue the Equal 
Suffrage Entrenchment Provision is flatly unamendable.  See supra note 107 and 
accompanying text.  Also, compare this use of “ever” to the argument in infra Part IV at 
notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
117.  See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.  
118.  See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.  
119.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
120.  See AMAR, supra note 19, at 293–95 (noting the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment 
Provision “was far from airtight, perhaps reflecting the unconsidered manner in which it was 
adopted late in the Philadelphia deliberations”). 
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sometimes thought to be protected, but it is protected to a degree 
greater than almost all other provisions in the Constitution. 
Article V’s two entrenchment provisions, despite their differences in 
effectiveness, sprang from the common cause of compromise and were 
designed to seal two bargains across the deepest divisions in the nation: 
slave states and non-slave states; small states and large states.121 
IV. THE ARTICLE VI NO RELIGIOUS TEST PROVISION 
Article V displays complete but temporary self-entrenchment in the 
Sunset Entrenchment Provision, and perhaps attempted, but ultimately 
ineffective, self-entrenchment in the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment 
Provision.  Now we consider a provision outside Article V—the No 
Religious Test Provision (emphasized below) in Clause 3 of Article VI 
of the Constitution: 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the 
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and 
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States.122 
The No Religious Test Provision is the only provision in the original 
Constitution (or in any amendment) to include the word “ever.”123  Nor 
can I locate any other term of permanence in the Constitution: the 
words never, forever, always, continual, permanent, and perpetual do 
not appear in the Constitution.  I argue this signature use of “ever” 
means the prohibition on religious tests was intended to be, and is, 
 
121.  James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 
355, 362 (1994) (“Perhaps Article V entrenches provisions that reflect deep compromises with 
our Constitution’s constitutive principles: the protection of the African slave trade with the 
principle that all persons are created equal, and the equal representation of the states in the 
Senate with the principle of the equal representation of citizens.  The founders of the 
Constitution concluded that both compromises were necessary to ‘the forging of the Union’: 
the slave states insisted upon the former, the small states upon the latter.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also ANASTAPLO, supra note 111, at 193–95 (noting the relationship between 
entrenchment and the two major compromises).  
122.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
123.  This use of “ever” in the No Religious Test Provision makes the word’s omission 
from the Equal Suffrage Entrenchment Provision even more pointed.  See supra note 116 and 
accompanying text. 
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unamendable.124  That word is the difference between the usual case in 
which a constitutional provision has a life with an indefinite length 
(effective until amended) and a special case in which a provision is 
guaranteed perpetuity.  The No Religious Test Provision bans religious 
tests not merely into an indefinite but possibly terminable future, but for 
“ever.”125   
Both the usual meaning of “ever” and the word’s particular role in 
the No Religious Test Provision indicate it creates a self-entrenched 
(and therefore permanent) prohibition on religious tests.  The plain 
meaning of “ever” is an indication of perpetuity.126  That it is the only 
word of permanence in a constitution otherwise filled with effective-
until-amended provisions indicates its novelty is significant.  Were 
“ever” merely some sort of intensifier or aspiration, one might expect 
the word or something similar to be used in other places where similar 
intensity or aspiration were intended.  But “ever” stands alone.  The 
uniqueness of “ever” is not happenstance.  A few other provisions 
containing words of permanence were offered as motions or even 
referred to the Committee of Detail, but none survived to enter the 
Constitution’s text.127 
 
124.  Several years ago, I wondered at the uniqueness of the “no . . . ever” phrasing in 
the No Religious Test Clause.  Then and now, to the best of my research ability, I have 
uncovered in the scholarly literature only one reference to the Religious Test Provision being 
a potentially unamendable provision—Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About Deliberation, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1992), a book review of Bruce Ackerman’s book, We the People: 
Foundations.  In a footnote Schauer writes there are “two or three explicitly unamendable 
provisions [in] the U.S. Constitution”: the “Article V” entrenchment provisions and 
“somewhat more ambiguously, [the provision in] Article VI . . . ‘no religious Test shall ever 
be required as a Qualification to any Office.’”  Id. at 1190 n.5. 
125.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  Consider the statement of Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph Story, who served on the Court from 1811 to 1845.  In his 1833 classic, Commentaries 
on the Constitution of the United States, Story wrote the No Religious Test Provision’s “higher 
object” is “to cut off for ever every pretence of any alliance between church and state in the 
national government.”  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 705 (1833) (emphasis added).   
126.  Ever, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2001).  
127.  During the Convention, Elbridge Gerry proposed the representatives from new 
states in what would come to be named the House of Representatives “shall never exceed in 
number, the Representatives from such of the [original thirteen] States (as shall accede to this 
confederation),” which was defeated by a vote of 4–5–1.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 47, at 2–3 (emphasis added).   
 Two of South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney’s August 20 proposals to the 
convention, see infra notes 137–43 and accompanying text, contain words of permanency: (1) 
“The military shall always be subordinate to the Civil power”; and (2) “The U.S. shall be for 
ever considered as one Body corporate and politic in law, and be entitled to all the rights 
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Consider, too, what happens if the word “ever” is removed from the 
No Religious Test Provision.  Without the word “ever,” the key part of 
the provision reads: “[N]o religious test shall be required,” which would 
prohibit religious tests every bit as well as the actual provision does.  
The modified provision, however, clearly would be amendable.  To read 
the provision exactly the same way without “ever” as with it, makes the 
word superfluous, a situation generally considered intolerable in 
constitutional interpretation.128   
That “ever” adds nothing to the provision’s substantive prohibition 
on religious tests indicates its role is to distinguish the clause from the 
general category of provisions that are effective-until-amended.  That is 
the only way for the word “ever” to be given effect.129  “[N]o religious 
Test shall ever be required”130 is identical to a provision stating: “No 
religious test shall be required and no amendment may be made that 
would allow a religious test.”  As a modifier to the verb form 
“shall . . . be required,” “no[t] . . . ever” creates a permanent prohibition 
on religious tests by barring any change in the Constitution that would 
make such tests possible.   
 
privileges, and immunities, which to Bodies corporate do or ought to appertain.”  2 THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 340–42 (emphasis added).  Both were referred to 
committee and never acted upon.  Id.   
 Among the Committee of Detail’s papers is a draft that would limit the size of the House 
of Representatives to an unspecified maximum—“shall never be greater in number than 
[____]”—this proposal was eliminated before the committee reported.  Id. at 138 (emphasis 
added); see also SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 184 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987).  Also among the Committee of 
Detail’s papers is a draft with this provision: “Direct Taxation shall always be in Proportion 
to . . . Representation in the House of Representatives.”  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 
supra note 47, at 153 (emphasis added).  The same provision is crossed out in a later draft and 
was not reported by the committee to the Convention.  Id. at 168.   
128.  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 260 (James Madison) (Penguin Books 1987) (advocating as a rule of 
construction “dictated by plain reason as well as founded on legal axioms” that “every part of 
the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to 
some common end”); Amar, supra note 43, at 1068 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause emphatically 
proclaims that ‘this Constitution’—which presumably means every clause—is ‘supreme 
law’ . . . .”).  
129.  Compare this to the situation of the word “consent” in the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision, where that word needed to perform double duty if the provision 
was to be self-entrenched.  Here, “ever” is not needed to prohibit religious tests, rather it is 
needed (and useful only for) the entrenchment of the prohibition on religious tests. 
130.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  
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Imagine an amendment that would attempt to remove the No 
Religious Test Provision.  At step one of the two-step process, we ask 
whether removal of the provision would violate the provision itself.  It is 
true the removal of the No Religious Test Provision would not impose a 
religious test, but there being no religious test is not what the No 
Religious Test Provision stands for.  It stands for there never being a 
religious test.131  So the appropriate question is: would removal of the 
provision be a violation of there “no[t] . . . ever”132 being a religious test?  
To violate a proscription on religious tests forever, there would have to 
be a test “at some point in time.”  So the only way an amendment 
ridding the Constitution of the provision would not violate the provision 
itself is if the amendment came with a guarantee that despite it allowing 
a religious test at “some point in time,” that time would never come.  
But that is simply the No Religious Test Provision back again—no 
religious test ever.  One cannot disentrench the prohibition on religious 
tests by means of the two-step process previously discussed;133 the first 
step is impossible.  Thus, under a textual analysis, the prohibition on a 
religious test as qualification for federal officeholders is a permanent 
part of the U.S. Constitution; it is completely self-entrenched and is 
unamendable.  
The No Religious Test Provision was a stark departure from the 
practices in the states, so one possible argument against the Framers 
intending a perpetual ban on religious tests for federal officeholders is 
the seeming oddness of the ban itself in its historical context.134  In 1787, 
of the thirteen states, only New York and Virginia did not require a 
religious test for public office, and New York soon would add a test.135  
 
131.  See id. 
132.  Id.  
133.  See supra pp. 852–53.  
134.  Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious 
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 680 (1986–1987) 
(“[A]rticle VI was a significant departure from existing legal practice and from popular 
beliefs. . . . [T]he test ban is explainable not by any sudden eruption of Enlightenment 
rationalism or Jeffersonian skepticism, which transformed overnight a society’s thinking . . . .  
To put the proposition most [succinctly]: the founding generation entered the process of 
constitution-making firmly convinced that only Christians (and largely, only Protestants) 
should hold public office.  They exited the process with those views intact.  Yet article VI was 
clearly understood to contravene that belief.”).  
135.  See Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections 
on the Article VI Religious Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261, 265–68 (1996) (collecting state 
constitutional provisions and laws); see also EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: 
RELIGION AND THE NEW NATION 159–74 (1987) (excerpting religion clauses from the early 
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Taking together all state constitutions, statutes, and oaths at the time of 
the Constitutional Convention, non-Christians were barred from state 
office everywhere with the possible exception of Virginia, and Catholics 
were barred everywhere with the exceptions of Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, and Delaware.136 
Yet despite the prevalence of religious tests in the states, there was 
almost no discussion on the topic at the Convention, not even when the 
ban on religious tests was proposed.137  On August 20, Charles Pinckney, 
delegate of South Carolina, proposed a list of changes to the draft 
constitution.138  The proposals addressed several different issues 
scattered through the articles—and included the following: “No 
religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of office 
under the authority of the United States.”139  These proposals were 
referred to the Committee of Detail without consideration or debate.140  
Ten days later, when the delegates took up Article XX of the 
constitutional draft, which at that time read, “The members of the 
Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial officers of the United 
 
state constitutions).  Five state constitutions required officeholders to be Protestant, four 
more required officeholders to be Christian.  Dreisbach, supra, at 265–68.  In addition to 
these nine states, Connecticut and Rhode Island (in 1787, still functioning under Crown 
charters that did not mandate religious tests for officeholders) had enacted such tests by 
statute.  AMAR, supra note 19, at 166 n.98.   
 Some states with oaths ostensibly requiring mere Christianity rather than Protestantism 
yet had means of excluding Catholics.  Massachusetts, one of the states requiring an oath 
professing Christianity, but not Protestantism, had an additional oath abjuring the “power, in 
any matter, civil, ecclesiastical, or spiritual” of any “foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or 
potentate”—an oath directed at Roman Catholics and, perhaps, Anglicans.  Dreisbach, supra, 
at 267 (quoting MASS. CONST. of 1780 chap. VI, art. I, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 1888, 1908 (Thorpe ed., 1909)).  The New York constitution 
required prospective citizens to take a similar oath barring Catholics, Richard Albert, 
Religion in the New Republic, 67 LA. L. REV. 1, 29 n.131 (2006), and in 1788 the New York 
legislature passed a statute barring Catholics from office, see Dreisbach, supra, at 268. 
136.  Bradley, supra note 134, at 681–83.  Bradley notes that there were virtually no 
Catholics in Connecticut, due in part to fact that legal ecclesiastical corporate privileges were 
limited to Protestant sects.  Id. at 683.  In Virginia, any non-Christians (or unorthodox 
Christians, for example Unitarians) elected to a governmental office had the right to serve but 
“would have had to serve from jail, because both by common law and statute Virginia 
criminalized at least the public utterance of such views.”  Id. 
137.  See GAUSTAD, supra note 135, at 159. 
138.  2 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 47, at 334–39 (House Journal), 340–42 
(Madison’s Notes).  
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. at 342. 
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States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support this 
Constitution,” Pinckney moved to add to the oath provision “but no 
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or 
public trust under the authority of the U. States.”141  The Convention 
unanimously agreed to the amendment.142  The only recorded debate, if 
it could be called debate, was Roger Sherman’s strange remark, given 
the context noted above, that the provision seemed “unnecessary, the 
prevailing liberality being a sufficient security [against] such tests.”143 
However uncontroversial the prohibition on religious tests for 
federal officeholders was in the Convention, the topic was contended in 
the debates between Federalists and Antifederalists during the 
ratification period.144  Across the nation, Antifederalists criticized the 
Constitution for mentioning God too little, for being insufficiently 
Christian.145  More particularly, delegates in various of the state ratifying 
 
141.  Id. at 461 (House Journal), 468 (Madison’s Notes).   
142.  Id.  The article itself, as amended, was passed by a vote of eight or nine states, 
North Carolina against, with Maryland’s delegation divided (and perhaps Connecticut’s too—
the House Journal shows Connecticut divided, Madison reports Connecticut in favor).  Id. at 
460 (House Journal), 468 (Madison’s Notes).  
143.  Id. at 468.  The No Religious Test Provision “was adopted by a great majority of 
the convention, and without much debate.”  LUTHER MARTIN, THE GENUINE 
INFORMATION, in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 app. A, at 172, 227 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911).   
 Referring to the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Bradley writes:  
Here were fifty-odd of the leading men of a generation . . . who, as state leaders, had 
expended great energy on the problem [of the proper scope of “religious liberty” 
from government]. . . . [E]very state constitution drawn up in that time spoke 
directly, frequently at substantial length, to the issue.  This group of men drafted an 
entire scheme of national government in this climate, and religion is barely, rarely 
mentioned.  A total “non-issue.” 
 How much of a “non-issue”? . . . Religion is not mentioned at all until after, and 
only because of, proposals to bind all state and federal officers to the Constitution 
by “oath[,]” [which led to Pinckney’s proposal] that “[n]o religious test or 
qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of office under the authority of the 
U.S.” 
Bradley, supra note 134, at 691–92 (footnote omitted). 
144.  See Bradley, supra note 134, at 694–721. 
145.  Luther Martin, delegate from Maryland, wrote during the ratification period:  
[T]here were some members so unfashionable as to think, that a belief of the 
existence of a Deity, and of a state of future rewards and punishments would be some 
security for the good conduct of our rulers, and that, in a Christian country, it would 
be at least decent to hold out some distinction between the professors of Christianity 
and downright infidelity or paganism. 
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conventions objected to non-Christians being eligible for office in the 
new United States government.146  
One might argue that this radical departure from state practice 
indicates perpetuity of the prohibition on religious tests could not have 
been intended, that perpetuity is, given the socio-political context in 
1787,147 an absurd result.  But that argument proves too much.  It is an 
argument for the ban on religious tests not being in the Constitution at 
all, but does not address the permanence of that ban.  
In actuality, given that there was to be a prohibition on religious 
tests, it made sense that the prohibition be unamendable.  There were 
already religious tests in the states.148  If, at the federal level a test could 
be imposed149—if, that is, the No Religious Test Provision were 
amendable—a religious test would be imposed when some religious 
denomination had achieved a supermajority status throughout the 
nation.  That is precisely the situation that would allow use of a religious 
test to oppress those adhering to minority religious faiths.150  
That specter of religious tyranny at the federal level was the winning 
argument for the Federalists in the ratification debates on the No 
Religious Test Provision.151  The variety of sects in the United States in 
 
MARTIN, supra note 143, at 227; see also Bradley, supra note 134, at 694–95. 
146.  Bradley, supra note 134, at 695–96.  
147.  See id. at 679–94. 
148.  Dreisbach, supra note 135, at 265–69. 
149.  The provision applied only to federal officers, not state officers.  This is clear from 
the provision’s application only to “Office or public Trust under the United States” (rather 
than in the United States).  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also Bradley, 
supra note 134, at 693; Dreisbach, supra note 135, at 262 & n.5 (citing 1 ANSON PHELPS 
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 523 (1950)). 
150.  Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of 
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in 
the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 951 (1996) (“Religious tests had long 
been a favored instrument for preserving the political power of established churches and 
denying equal political opportunity to adherents of other creeds. . . . [T]he test ban preempted 
the prospect of a national ecclesiastical establishment by removing a useful mechanism for a 
religious denomination to exert control over the political processes.”).  
 Justice Joseph Story, closer in time to the events, put it this way: “It is easy to foresee, 
that without some prohibition of religious tests, a successful sect, in our country, might, by 
once possessing power, pass test-laws, which would secure to themselves a monopoly of all 
the offices of trust and profit, under the national government.”  STORY, supra note 125, at 
709. 
151.  See Bradley, supra note 134, at 702.  The Federalists also argued: (1) religious tests 
were useless in keeping the amoral and immoral from office—those without scruples would 
swear to any oath without fear and (2) the tests were counterproductive in that the very 
people who were principled and scrupulous (and therefore desired for public office) would be 
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1787 meant that on the national scene, no sect yet had the power to 
impose itself.152  In a letter to Thomas Jefferson written in October of 
1787, Madison showed an awareness of the dangers of a dominant 
religion when he outlined the argument that later appeared in The 
Federalist No. 10.153  In analyzing whether religion can restrain majority 
oppression of the minority, Madison wrote: “When Indeed Religion is 
kindled into enthusiasm, its force like that of other passions is increased 
by the sympathy of the multitude. . . . If the same sect form a majority 
and have the power, other sects will be sure to be depressed.”154 
A year later, James Iredell, at the North Carolina ratifying 
convention, put it slightly differently: “This article is calculated to secure 
universal religious liberty, by putting all sects on a level—the only way 
to prevent persecution.”155 
Other Federalists argued similarly, and in a manner that looked to 
the future, perhaps indicating an appreciation of the perpetuity of the 
No Religious Test Provision.  Lieutenant Governor Oliver Wolcott, in 
the Connecticut ratifying convention, stated: 
For myself, I should be content either with or without the clause 
in the constitution which excludes Test-Laws.  Knowledge and 
liberty are so prevalent in this country, that I do not believe that 
the United States would ever be disposed to establish one 
religious sect, and lay all others under legal disabilities.  But as 
we know not what may take place hereafter, and any such test 
would be exceedingly injurious to the rights of free citizens, I 
cannot think it altogether superfluous to add a clause which 
secures us from the possibility of such oppression.156 
The emphasized language here—“we know not what may take place 
hereafter” and “secur[ity] . . . from the possibility of such 
 
the ones to refuse the test.  Id. at 698. 
152.  See id. at 702–11. 
153.  Id. at 704 (summarizing Madison’s letter to Jefferson and noting the letter was a 
“fleshy outline” for Federalist 10). 
154.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 644, 647 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
155.  4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 196 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
156.  Speeches of Samuel Huntington, Oliver Wolcott, Sr., and Richard Law in the 
Connecticut Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 312, 316 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1984) (emphasis added). 
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oppression”157—can be taken to be a nod to the permanence of the 
language in the No Religious Test Provision, as can the following, from 
a Federalist writing in the Pennsylvania Gazette:  
The Presbyterians, the Quakers, the Congregationalists, the 
Anabaptists, the Roman Catholics, and several other churches, 
all of whom now enjoy the most perfect religious liberty, . . . and 
all of whom have the freest access to places of honor or profit in 
the government [of Pennsylvania].  The new [federal] 
constitution confirms and secures to all for ever those great 
blessings, by providing, in the most clear and positive terms, that 
no religious test shall ever be required of any officer of the 
United States.158 
This concern about religious liberty and religious domination is what 
drove the lack of controversy at the Constitutional Convention.  The No 
Religious Test Provision is “attribute[ed] . . . to the conditions of 
pluralism.  No Abstract principle but the jealousies of antagonistic sects 
wrought the test ban.”159  
Both the plain meaning of “ever” and its unique presence in the No 
Religious Test Provision demonstrate the provision is completely self-
entrenched.  The provision is yet another compromise to join those that 
gave rise to the Sunset Entrenchment Provision and the Equal Suffrage 
Entrenchment Provision, though this compromise is different in that it 
was multi-lateral rather than bilateral.  This was an instance of every 
state wanting to preserve religious freedom rather than two sides 
battling over middle ground.   
V. UNAMENDABLE AMENDMENTS  
Now we leave behind the original Constitution and ask whether we 
can entrench into the Constitution our own permanent provisions.  It is 
 
157.  Id.  
158.  Pennsylvania Gazette (July 16, 1788), reprinted in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 269, 270 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995) (emphasis added). 
159.  Bradley, supra note 134, at 721; see also ANASTAPLO, supra note 111, at 207 
(writing the No Religious Test Provision was “shaped . . . by an awareness of the problem, 
and hence the danger, of any effort by the General Government to order a religious test for 
the Country at large, especially considering the diversity in religious sentiments from State to 
State” and comparing this concern to that which brought about the provision as to electors for 
the House of Representatives having the same qualifications as the state required for electors 
of the most numerous house of the state legislature). 
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all well and good that a portion of the Constitution was truly 
unamendable until 1808, and that the somewhat obscure No Religious 
Test Provision, which in great part has been overtaken by the 
Establishment Clause,160 is unamendable.  But the real question in all of 
this is can we do the same?  My answer is that there have been, to this 
point, no amendments that are unamendable, but there is also, at this 
point, nothing to prevent our creating one. 
This part first addresses the argument sometimes made that the First 
Amendment is entrenched into the Constitution.  It is not.  Then the 
next part addresses whether it is constitutional for an amendment to 
make itself, or a part of the existing Constitution, unamendable.  That is 
possible, and it has been seriously attempted, though not achieved. 
A. The First Amendment Is Not Entrenched 
Some have argued that the First Amendment may not be amended 
because it contains its own explicit limit on amendment.161  This is not 
the same argument noted earlier in which it is posited free speech or 
other aspects of the First Amendment are implicit limitations on the 
amending power due to their overriding importance to the United States 
mode of government.162  Rather, this argument is based on the 
introductory phrase to the First Amendment, admonishing that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting[,] . . . prohibiting[,] . . . or 
abridging” the various topics contained in the First Amendment.163  
Proponents of the argument take this language to mean Congress may 
not propose such an amendment, as by passing the proposal Congress is 
“mak[ing] law”—thus such an amendment may be proposed only 
through the convention method of amendment.164 
 
160.  See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down Maryland’s religious 
test requiring “a declaration of a belief in the existence of God” as a violation of the federal 
First Amendment Establishment Clause).  
161.  See, e.g., Eric Alan Isaacson, The Flag Burning Issue: A Legal Analysis and 
Comment, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 535 (1990); Murphy, supra note 110, at 175 n.40. 
162.  See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
163.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
164.  See, e.g., Isaacson, supra note 161, at 587–99 (noting that a literal reading of the 
First Amendment’s “Congress shall make no law” might require that any amendment of its 
substance be carried out under the constitutional convention method); Murphy, supra note 
110, 175 n.40; see also Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 289 (1996) (“[T]he 
language of the First Amendment itself may be interpreted to require any revision of First 
Amendment to go through the convention process.”).  But see John R. Vile, The Case Against 
Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: 
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The argument is incorrect.  First, consider that the Framers 
determined it necessary to entrench (in the Sunset Entrenchment 
Provision) the first clause of Section 9 of Article I, which reads: 
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the 
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be 
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.165 
If the First Amendment phrase, “Congress shall make no law,”166 
entrenched itself by prohibiting Congress from proposing a repealing 
amendment, then the very similar phrase “shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress” would have done the same.  Yet we know the above language 
was not self-entrenching; if “shall not be prohibited by Congress” would 
have barred Congress proposing an amendment of the provision, there 
would have been no need for the Sunset Entrenchment Provision.167  
The resulting inference is that the clause declaring the slave trade “shall 
not be prohibited by the Congress” does not itself prohibit Congress 
from proposing constitutional amendments that prohibit the slave trade.  
Thus, the similar phrase, “Congress shall make no law,”168 does not 
prohibit congressional proposals for amending the First Amendment.   
In addition, there simply is no indication in the pre-Bill-of-Rights 
Constitution that the word “law” included constitutional amendment 
proposals.169  “Law” or “laws” appear thirty-four times in the original 
 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 191, 204 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995) (replying to Isaacson’s argument and noting Isaacson cites no direct 
evidence that one of the intentions of those who pressed for or ratified the First Amendment 
was to limit the amending process, nor explains why it would be more acceptable for 
conventions, rather than Congress, to do it).   
 Katz goes on to note that later incorporation of the First Amendment to apply to the 
states arguably implies that both congressional proposal of an amendment and legislative 
ratification by the states would be “laws,” thus requiring both the amendment proposal and 
ratification be by convention method.  Katz, supra, at 289 & n.173.  
165.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
166.  Id. amend. I.  
167.  Nor can one make the argument that the Sunset Entrenchment Provision was 
created to prevent amendment by convention.  John Rutledge proposed the Sunset 
Entrenchment Provision as an alteration to an amending provision that allowed amendment 
only by congressional proposal.  See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (laying out a 
timeline of Article V’s construction and the details of Rutledge’s proposal). 
168.  Id. amend. I.  
169.  An argument slightly different from the one in the text was made by Attorney 
General Charles Lee in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), in which the 
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Constitution, but in no instance is the word “law” used to mean a 
constitutional amendment proposal.  Indeed, only with specific 
modifying language is the Constitution itself referred to as “law.”170  The 
words “law” and “laws” appear fourteen times in situations where they 
are explicitly or implicitly tied to Congress in such a way as to make 
clear that “law” and “laws” indicate statutes and an additional four 
times in the description of the Article I, Section 7, process by which a 
bill becomes a law.171  The word appears four more times in terms of art 
with well-established meanings172 and in seven instances, the reference is 
to state laws.173  Twice more the text refers to “Laws” in juxtaposition to 
the Constitution.174  Three more instances are the Take Care Clause, the 
Supremacy Clause’s “Law of the Land,” and the Militia Clause’s “Laws 
of the Union.”175  Throughout the original Constitution, without specific 
language indicating otherwise, “law” and “laws” refers to statutory 
law.176  Article V does not refer to amendment proposals as “law.”177  
The First Amendment is not an example of an unamendable 
amendment.  
B. Is It Possible to Create an Unamendable Amendment? 
Recall the language from Article V: “The Congress . . . shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or . . . shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all 
 
Eleventh Amendment was challenged on the ground that the President had not signed the 
Congressional proposal sent to the states.  Lee argued that “[a]n amendment of the 
constitution, and the repeal of a law, are not, manifestly, on the same footing” and that 
policies and rules that applied to legislation (e.g., prohibition on ex post facto laws) did not 
apply to amendment of the Constitution.  Id. at 380–81.  The Court accepted the distinction 
between a law and an amendment proposal and held that the President’s signature was 
unnecessary.  Id. at 382.  
170.  See TRIBE, supra note 110, at 112 n.6. 
171.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 3, cl. 7, § 4, cls. 1–2, § 6, cl. 1, § 7, cl. 2, § 8, cls. 4, 
18, § 9, cls. 3, 7; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, § 2, cl. 2 (twice); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. IV, § 1. 
172.  See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“Law of Nations”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“Courts of Law”); 
id. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2 (“Law and Equity” and “Law and Fact”). 
173.  See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (twice), cl. 2 (twice); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (twice); id. art. VI, 
cl. 2. 
174.  Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (the Supremacy Clause).  Professor Vile 
notes this same distinction as to Article VI’s Supremacy Clause.  Vile, supra note 164, at 205. 
175.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, id. art. II, § 3; id. art. VI, cl. 2.   
176.  TRIBE, supra note 110, at 112 n.6.  
177.  VILE, supra note 17, at 138 (“[T]he language of Article V where the amending 
power is specified does not refer to amendments as laws but as amendments”); Vile, supra 
note 164, at 204. 
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Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified . . . .”178  
A plain reading suggests ratified amendments are part of the 
Constitution on equal footing with provisions of the original 
Constitution.  Amendments are “valid as part of [this] Constitution.”179  
This language would seem to indicate amendments are not second-class 
provisions, somehow lesser than the original Constitution or somehow 
limited in what they may contain.  So, if the original Constitution 
contains unamendable provisions (as I have argued), there may be 
unamendable amendments.  
Countering this plain reading, one might attempt to argue that 
amendments really are somehow different from the original 
Constitution—created under a different procedure as part of less 
encompassing bargains than the original Constitution.180  Under this 
argument, any unamendability present in the Constitution of 1787 might 
be part of a one-time-only “package deal” and, as amendments were not 
part of this arrangement, they are not allowed to take on permanence in 
the same way parts of the original Constitution did.181  
Indeed, one can find some pedigreed discussion seemingly 
supporting this sentiment, at least insofar as there is a difference 
between the political means of amendment versus the political means of 
drafting and ratifying the Constitution.  During the 1st Congress in 1789, 
when James Madison’s proposals for constitutional amendments (ten of 
which became the Bill of Rights) were considered in the House of 
Representatives, they were intended to be interlineated into the 
Constitution as it existed rather than appended as separate articles.182  
 
178.  U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).  
179.  González, supra note 99, at 1455. 
180.  Id.  Professor González argues the “Intents and Purposes” language does not mean 
amendments have the same hierarchic status as the main body of the Constitution.  Id. at 
1454–55. 
181.  One might draw inferences from Hamliton, in The Federalist No. 85, of a difference 
between amendments and an original bargain.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander 
Hamilton).  There Hamilton compares trying to perfect the Constitution before ratification 
rather than by amendment afterward:  
[E]very amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single 
proposition, and might be brought forward singly.  There would then be no necessity 
for management or compromise in relation to any other point . . . .  There can, 
therefore, be no comparison between the facility of effecting an amendment and 
that of establishing, in the first instance, a complete Constitution. 
Id. at 485 (Penguin Books 1987). 
182.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 706 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also Hartnett, 
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Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued: “We ought not to interweave 
our propositions into the work itself, because it will be destructive of the 
whole fabric.”183  Sherman continued:  
Besides . . . , it is questionable whether we have the right to 
propose amendments in this way.  The Constitution is the act of 
the people, and ought to remain entire.  But the amendments 
will be the act of the State Governments. . . . [I]f we mean to 
destroy the whole, and establish a new Constitution, we remove 
the basis on which we mean to build.184 
And again later: 
[C]onsider the authorities upon which the two Constitutions are 
to stand.  The original was established by the people at large, by 
conventions chosen by them for the express purpose.  The 
preamble to the Constitution declares the act; but will it be a 
truth in ratifying the next Constitution, which is to be done 
perhaps by the State Legislatures, and not conventions chosen 
for the purpose?  Will gentlemen say it is “We the people” in this 
case? . . . . All that is granted us by the 5th article is, that . . . we 
may propose amendments to the Constitution; not that we may 
propose to repeal the old, and substitute a new one.185 
Several speakers weighed in on the topic.186  Some speakers 
expressed a concern that appending the amendments, rather than 
incorporating them, would insinuate they were less than equal with the 
original text.187  In the end, after a second debate on the topic, Sherman 
 
supra note 27, at 252–58, 284–99 (reprising the argument and reproducing the Constitution as 
Hartnett believes it would look if the decision to display the amendments as an appendix 
rather than as interlineations, had come out in favor of interlineations). 
183.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).   
184.  Id. at 707–08; cf. Rogers & Molzon, supra note 99, at 1005–06 (addressing whether 
amendments proposed by a constitutional convention would require ratification in 
accordance with Article V, or whether the convention could make its own rule for adoption 
of the amendments, as did the Constitutional Convention of 1787). 
185.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 715 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
186.  Id. at 707–17; see also Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional 
Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 127–29 (1993) (tracking the 
ensuing debate as to placement of the amendments). 
187.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 708–09 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (recording how 
Mr. William L. Smith of South Carolina noted that appending the amendments would seem 
to violate Article V’s provision that amendments duly ratified were to be “part” of the 
Constitution); id. at 712 (Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts arguing that “if . . . the original is 
to be kept sacred, amendments will be of no use” but if amendments are to be “equal in 
authority” and appended, “we shall have five or six constitutions, perhaps differing in 
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and those in favor of appending the amendments, rather than 
incorporating them, won.188 
Although the debate sometimes contained words distinguishing 
amendments from the original Constitution, the debate was 
fundamentally about textual separation, not the legal reach of the 
amendments.  Already in 1804 the Twelfth Amendment rewrote the 
manner of electing the President, thereby altering the original 
Constitution.189  So the text—“valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part 
of this Constitution”190—does indicate amendments have at least the full 
creative sweep of the original Constitution.  
If amendments are every bit as much a part of the Constitution as 
those portions that have been there since 1787, the Sunset 
Entrenchment Provision and the prohibition on religious tests for 
federal officers provide precedents in the original Constitution for an 
amendment to entrench either itself or already-existing provisions of the 
Constitution.  A new amendment to the Constitution could declare: 
“Neither Article II of this Constitution, nor this clause, may be 
amended.”  Or the amendment could declare and entrench a completely 
new provision: “No person shall be eligible to be elected Senator if such 
person has served a total of 12 years as a Senator of the United States.  
This article is not amendable.”  
United States citizens can choose to bind themselves and citizens of 
the future just as the Framers did.  Indeed, a previous generation of 
Americans attempted to create and ratify into the Constitution 
unamendable provisions. 
Just as compromise drove the entrenchment provisions in Article V, 
(north–south, small state–large state),191 and concerns about religious 
freedom and domination led to the No Religious Test Provision,192 
attempts during the winter of 1860 to 1861 to avert civil war drove the 
next round of proposals to substantively limit amendment to the 
Constitution. 
For some time prior to Lincoln’s election in 1860, statesmen had 
argued that the solution to north–south tensions lay in entrenching into 
 
material points from each other, but all equally valid”). 
188.  Id. at 766. 
189.  U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
190.  Id. art. V. 
191.  See supra Part III.  
192.  See supra Part IV.  
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the Constitution accommodations to slavery.193  Throughout the 1840s 
and 1850s, westward expansion and the admission of new states—new 
free states—led the slaveholding South to ever-increasingly fear slavery 
would be abolished by constitutional amendment.194  Immediately prior 
to the Civil War, several constitutional amendments aimed at 
compromise were proposed; amid the string of southern secessions, each 
house of Congress established special ad hoc committees to consider 
and propose amendments that might avert disunion.195  Between 
December 3, 1860, and Lincoln’s inauguration on March 4, 1861, “fifty-
seven distinct amendment proposals, contained in over 200 individual 
resolutions, were laid before Congress.”196   
Of the many offerings, two proposals were the most significant.  The 
earlier and more comprehensive of these was proposed by Kentucky 
Senator John J. Crittenden; but it was the later, largely derivative 
proposal by Ohio Representative Thomas Corwin that resulted in a 
formal constitutional amendment proposal.197   
The so-called Crittenden proposals comprised a set of six 
amendments, the first five of which (1) divided U.S. territories into free 
and slave, depending on which side of the 36º30' latitude the territory 
sat, with states to be admitted slave and free as their constitutions 
stated; (2) declared Congress had no power to abolish slavery in federal 
enclaves in southern states; (3) declared Congress had no power to 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia so long as slavery existed in 
Maryland or Virginia, and required just compensation in the event of 
abolition; (4) declared Congress had no power to prohibit or hinder 
transportation of slaves; and (5) added to the Constitution’s fugitive 
slave provision.198  
The sixth and last of Crittenden’s proposals is the key one for our 
discussion.  It bound the other five proposals together by entrenching 
 
193.  See KYVIG, supra note 24, at 145. 
194.  Id. at 144–45 (citing AMES, supra note 84, at 354) (noting that a North Carolina 
congressman in 1850 proposed a constitutional amendment forbidding the abolition of 
slavery).  
195.  Id. at 146–47.  
196.  Id. at 146.  For a full account of the various amendment proposals and other 
stratagems occurring during the second session of the 36th Congress, see Patsy S. Ledbetter, 
John J. Crittenden and the Compromise Debacle, 51 FILSON CLUB HIST. Q. 125 (1977) 
(comprising a carefully researched timeline of various peace proposals and containing very 
helpful, specific citations to the congressional debates). 
197.  Bryant, supra note 21, at 514–15. 
198.  CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1861). 
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them, and added other entrenchments as well:  
No future amendment of the Constitution shall affect the five 
preceding articles; nor the third paragraph of the second section 
of the first article [representation and direct taxes to be 
apportioned according to the Three–Fifths Clause] of said 
Constitution; and no amendment shall be made to the 
Constitution which shall authorize or give to Congress any power 
to abolish or interfere with slavery in any of the States by whose 
laws it is, or may be, allowed or permitted.199 
Consider the first half of this sixth proposal, up to “and no 
amendment.”  It follows the template of the Sunset Entrenchment 
Provision, using the “no future amendment . . . shall affect”200 language.  
Just as the Sunset Entrenchment Provision was mediately self-
entrenched, so is this first half of the proposal.  To remove it would 
“affect” the preceding five proposals by disentrenching them.  Thus, if 
they had entered the Constitution, the first five proposals and the first 
half of the sixth proposal would have been unamendable.   
This second half of the sixth Crittenden proposal, however, was 
logically flawed and would not have been effective in barring the sorts of 
amendments it was designed to prohibit—it would not have completely 
entrench anything because it was not itself completely entrenched.  
Seeing this result is not easy, so let’s take it slowly, step by step. 
The second half of the proposal states, “[N]o amendment shall be 
made . . . which shall authorize or give to Congress any power to abolish 
or interfere with slavery [where it exists].”201  If the Crittenden proposals 
had become part of the Constitution, the Constitution at that moment in 
time either would or would not already have granted power to Congress 
to “interfere with slavery.”202  Let us take each case one at a time. 
If, on the one hand, Congress had such power already, the 
provision’s bar on future amendments from authorizing the power 
would not have removed that already-existing power.  Nor would the 
provision have stopped Congress from exercising the power it had.  
Thus, repeal of the provision would have no effect on congressional 
power, and repeal of the provision would not violate the provision by 
 
199.  Id. 
200.  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
201.  CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1861). 
202.  The extent of such a power to “interfere,” if it existed, would have been diminished 
by the preceding five Crittenden proposals, which, as noted above, would have been effective.   
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authorizing Congress to do anything.  The provision was not self-
entrenched and would have been revocable. 
If, on the other hand, Congress had no such power to interfere with 
slavery,203 then an amendment removing the part of the proposal 
addressing “future amendment[s]” would not itself authorize or give to 
Congress any power (as there would be no latent power ready to spring 
to life once the provision was removed).  So, a removal of that portion 
of the sixth provision would not violate it.  Once removed, there would 
be no bar to an amendment giving to Congress the power to interfere 
with slavery (up to the limits imposed by the other five Crittenden 
proposals).   
Crittenden’s plan for an amendatory compromise failed in the 
Senate in January 1861.204  It was revived and remained in play right up 
to the final days before Lincoln’s inauguration.205  Its importance here is 
that (1) it was a serious proposal, much debated and discussed, and (2) it 
was intended to contain, and did in fact contain, unamendable 
provisions.   
The Crittenden proposals aimed to be, and in large part would have 
been, truly unamendable amendments.  They were taken seriously and 
display an understanding and acceptance by many members of Congress 
that unamendable constitutional provisions and unamendable 
amendments were possible.206 
In late February, the House of Representatives passed by the 
required two-thirds majority and sent to the Senate an amendment 
proposal put forward by Representative Thomas Corwin of Ohio.207  
After several counterproposals, the Senate, on the last day of the 
session, finally concurred in the House’s proposal, which was then sent 
out to the states for ratification.208  The Corwin amendment proposal 
stated: 
 
203.  This appears to have been President Abraham Lincoln’s view on the issue.  See 
infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
204.  Ledbetter, supra note 196, at 136. 
205.  Id. at 137–39; see also R. Alton Lee, The Corwin Amendment in the Secession 
Crisis, 70 OHIO HIST. Q. 1 (1961).   
206.  Ledbetter, supra note 196, at 129–30. 
207.  Id. at 138. 
208.  Id. at 139–41.  The amendment proposal was ratified by Ohio and Maryland, and 
ineffectively ratified by convention in Illinois (the proposal had stated it was to be ratified by 
state legislatures).  It remains one of just six amendment proposals to clear Congress yet fail 
to be ratified by the states.   
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No Amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will 
authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, 
within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including 
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said 
State.209 
The first half of this proposal (the logical framework and, therefore, 
the part relevant to this investigation) is virtually identical to the second 
half of the sixth Crittenden proposal and suffers from the same logical 
flaws.210  Had the Corwin amendment been ratified, it would not have 
been unamendable.211  
What the Corwin proposal adds to our discussion is a legally 
significant act—a formal amendment proposal to the states212—applied 
to a proposal argued at the time to be unamendable.213  This legal status 
occasioned incoming President Lincoln to address it in his inauguration 
speech:  
I understand a proposed amendment to the constitution which 
amendment, however, I have not seen, has 
passed . . . Congress, . . . to the effect that the federal 
government, shall never interfere with the domestic institutions 
of the States, including that of persons held to 
service. . . . [H]olding such a provision to now be implied 
Constitutional law, I have no objection to it’s being made 
express, and irrevocable.214 
We therefore have, during the crisis of the winter of 1860 to 1861, 
official presidential and congressional recognition of the possibility of an 
 
209.  Corwin Amendment, No. 36-13, 12 Stat. 251 (1861); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1236 (1861).   
210.  Perhaps in a subconscious understanding of the flaw, Lee, supra note 205, at 22, 
incorrectly inserts the word “ever” into the Corwin Amendment (“No amendment shall ever 
be made”).  This error is perpetuated in VILE, supra note 27, at 118. 
211.  It appears at least some members of the Senate recognized those logical flaws in 
the Corwin Amendment.  See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1364 (1861) (Senator Pugh 
remarking: “[A] future amendment may . . . as equally supersede this as supersede the present 
Constitution.  If this had provided that the article itself should not be amended, except with 
the consent of all the States, then it would have had some practical benefit.”). 
212.  It remains one of just six amendment proposals to clear Congress yet fail to be 
ratified by the states.  See supra note 208. 
213.  There was significant Senate and House debate on the question of whether the 
proposal, should it be ratified, was truly unamendable.  For a digested legislative history of 
the Corwin amendment proposal, see Bryant, supra note 21, at 520–34; Lee, supra note 205. 
214.  President Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in 
HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN PRESIDENT-ELECT 473 (2008) (emphasis added). 
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irrevocable amendment.  When faced with a situation in which it seemed 
the only way to keep the Union was through a permanently binding 
compromise, Congress reached for exactly that tool, in a knowing, 
comprehending way.  This is our history.  
VI. SOME RAMIFICATIONS OF EXPLICIT UNAMENDABILITY 
We have looked at the text of the Constitution and found 
unamendability to be part of our constitutional past and our 
constitutional present.  The Crittenden and Corwin amendment 
proposals show unamendability has been understood to be an option in 
constitutional amendment, but we as a nation have not inserted any 
unamendability into the Constitution since its establishment.  This part, 
then, is dedicated to considering, if only in light, broad strokes, the 
wisdom of unamendable provisions.   
One of the mind-bending aspects of self-referential logic and 
unamendability is that an amending provision possessing the power to 
create provisions that will for all time be unamendable can, in seeming 
paradox, use that power to abjure forever the use of that same power.  
The Constitution can thus transform itself by amendment into a 
Constitution that can no longer create unamendability provisions.   
I said mind-bending—so once again, let’s take things one step at a 
time. 
I have argued that the Constitution’s amending power can create 
unamendable constitutional provisions.  One of those unamendable 
provisions the amending power can create is a ban on any future 
unamendable provisions.  All we need is an amendment eschewing them 
permanently: “Every future amendment to the Constitution shall be 
subject to amendment, but this provision may never be amended.”  
So we can choose, in a permanently binding way, to never, ever 
again allow the amending provision to create a permanent binding.  We 
can permanently give up our capability to permanently bind ourselves 
and our posterity.   
Should we?  There would be no going back.  Once unamendable 
amendments are (unamendably) forsaken, they are gone forever.  
Should we un-lock the door and throw away the key?   
One argument in favor of permanently throwing away the power to 
create unamendable provisions is the danger of making an irrevocable 
mistake by creating an unamendable provision we regret.  History warns 
us.  Our nation has used unamendability once to preserve religious 
diversity and once to (temporarily) entrench the slave trade and the 
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Three-Fifths Clause.  The Crittenden and Corwin amendment proposals 
were near misses that aimed to irrevocably allow slavery. 
Another consideration is the self-determination of future 
generations—by what right can we forever bind future generations?215  
The answer to that question, of course, is by right inserted into the 
Constitution by the Framers, who gave themselves the power to bind us.  
And perhaps we are glad they did.  Perhaps there is a value to having 
the ability to bind ourselves.  Surely there is that—value in being able to 
bind ourselves.  But again, the problem is that we bind not just ourselves 
but all other citizens, present and future, for all time.  
Still, though, it is not quite right to say if we discard our ability to 
make unamendable provisions, we show trust to future citizens and give 
them power.  In at least one respect, we actually remove power from 
them, and permanently.  We do not trust them with the power to bind 
permanently.  We take from them a tool they may one day wish 
available.   
In the end, my conclusion is this: I want to provide future 
generations with all the power that can be given them.  We do not know 
what they may need to do, so we ought not bind them.  The way to do 
that is by self-restraint, by not binding them with unamendable 
provisions of any kind, including a ban on future unamendable 
provisions.  The power we should hand over is an unused power to 
permanently bind.  
VII.CONCLUSION 
The states represented at the Constitutional Convention brought 
with them three major divisions: two bilateral splits (slave/non-slave, 
large/small) and one multilateral fragmentation (diversity of religion).  
The delegates fashioned compromises to fuse those divisions and 
created constitutional entrenchment provisions to bind the bargains.  In 
doing so, the Framers exhibited an appreciation of the logical and 
linguistic complexities inherent in such entrenchment and gave us a 
permanently unamendable ban on religious tests for federal 
officeholders. 
Those 1787 entrenchment provisions are part of our past and present 
as a nation, and they have served as models for later, ultimately 
 
215.  Amar, supra note 21, at 461 (“Could a legitimate amendment generally 
purport[ing] to make itself . . . immune from further amendment clearly violate the legal right 
of future generations to alter their Government?”).   
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unsuccessful attempts to create yet more unamendable constitutional 
provisions.  Such provisions are still possible—there is no constitutional 
bar to them.  We do have a choice: we can keep the power to one day 
again create an unamendable constitutional provision, or we can 
permanently give it up.  One choice allows us as a nation to bind 
ourselves, for better or worse, the other allows us to alter anything save 
the Framers’ ban on religious tests. 
